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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The Green Impact Zone of Missouri operated in Kansas City, Missouri from 2009 
until 2014 as a national model for place-based investment. Missouri Congressman Emanuel 
Cleaver II is credited with pioneering the initiative, which was overseen for five years by the 
Kansas City metropolitan-area regional planning organization, the Mid-America Regional 
Council. During those five years, the Green Impact Zone directed about $166 million dollars 
into a 150-square block area from 39th Street to 51st Street, including Troost and Prospect 
avenues as well as Emanuel Cleaver II Boulevard. The money came largely from federal 
funding made available in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
and went towards neighborhood infrastructure and investments in human capital, with an 
emphasis on environmental sustainability. The Green Impact Zone was designed to be highly 
visible, and it benefited to this end from public support from then-President Barack Obama 
and other White House personnel. When the initiative ultimately shut down in 2014 due to a 
lack of funding, it did so quietly, receiving much less fanfare in its final days than it did in its 
early days. The reputation of the Green Impact Zone is unclear at the present moment; 
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although it was successful in raising significant investment in an area that badly needed it, it 
missed out on major sources of funding. Revitalization of these neighborhoods is a gradual 
process, and it remains to be seen how much the areas will change in the years following the 
Green Impact Zone’s efforts.  
iv 
 
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
 The faculty listed below, appointed by the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, 
have examined a thesis titled “The Green Impact Zone of Missouri: An Analysis of Place-
Based Investment,” presented by Kevin Wickman, candidate for the Master of Science 
degree, and certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance. 
 
Supervisory Committee 
Steven Driever, Ph.D., Committee Chair 
Department of Geosciences 
 
Wei Ji, Ph.D. 
Department of Geosciences 
 
Caroline Davies, Ph.D. 
Department of Geosciences 
 
  
v 
 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. ii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 11 
3. A HISTORY OF INEQUALITY IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI ......................... 36 
4. THE GREEN IMPACT ZONE OF MISSOURI ....................................................... 59 
5. REFLECTIONS ON THE GREEN IMPACT ZONE OF MISSOURI ..................... 98 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 115 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................... 122 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 125 
VITA .................................................................................................................................... 135 
  
vi 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure Page 
1. Green Impact Zone Neighborhood Map ...................................................................... 3 
2. Kansas City, Missouri Annexation History 1853-2013 ............................................. 39 
4. 2010 Census Tract Reference Map ............................................................................ 58 
5. New Townhomes Designed by BNIM ....................................................................... 75 
6. Renovated Bancroft School Building ........................................................................ 77 
7. Exterior of the Mary L. Kelly Community Center .................................................... 80 
8. Exterior of the 5008 Prospect Business Incubator ..................................................... 82 
9. Troost Avenue Bridge at 48th Street Crossing over Brush Creek ............................. 88 
  
vii 
 
TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Kansas City, Missouri School District Enrollment by High School 1945-1975…… .53 
 
2. Total and Racial Population Change in Southeast Kansas City, Missouri 
1950-1970  ...................................................................................................................54 
 
3. Kansas City, Missouri Census Tracts with at Least 50% Black Population  ...............57 
4. Demographic Data for All of Kansas City, the Kansas City Urban Core, and the 
Green Impact Zone ......................................................................................................60 
 
5. Challenges and Potential of the Site Selected for the Green Impact Zone ..................62 
6. Green Impact Zone Partners ........................................................................................65 
7. Green Impact Zone TIGER Investments .....................................................................86 
  
viii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 My first thank you goes to everyone living in the Green Impact Zone. Each of you 
has a story to tell, and you are the reason that I wrote this thesis. To everyone that made the 
Green Impact Zone possible, thank you for your vision, leadership, and courage. You are a 
tremendous inspiration. 
 I must thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Steven Driever, who has guided me with equal 
parts patience and firmness. I hope that I have created something that you are proud of. 
Thanks to the rest of my supervisory committee, Dr. Wei Ji and Dr. Caroline Davies for their 
generosity, and for coming to my rescue when I needed to round out my committee. 
 Dr. Jimmy Adegoke has been a friend and a mentor to me. Thank you for seeing the 
potential in me and pushing me to achieve more than I could have on my own. The rest of the 
UMKC Department of Geosciences deserves my appreciation as well. I especially would like 
to recognize the tireless support I received from administrative assistants Mary McDonough 
and Jennifer Burrus. You made everything run, and I couldn’t have done any of this without 
you. 
 To my mom and dad, Betty and Dick Wickman, I owe everything. You have always 
believed in me and I’ll never be able to repay you.  
 Lastly, to Grace Fourman I’d like to propose a toast. I finally did it!   
  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 When I moved to Kansas City in 2011, I already had been introduced to The Green 
Impact Zone of Missouri, an experimental initiative that began in 2009 with boundaries that 
stopped only a few blocks from where I had chosen to live. My introduction came through 
headlines such as “Kansas City’s Green Impact Zone – A Vision for 21st Century Urban 
Renewal” (Buffa, 2009), which seemed to promise a revolutionary model of urban renewal 
that would transform a 150-square-block area of Kansas City from struggling to sustainable. 
The goal of this initiative was to invest heavily in neighborhood infrastructure (public 
transportation, sidewalk and road renovations, neighborhood community centers, home 
weatherization, and so forth) and to bring the emerging “green” economy to an area of 
central Kansas City that had suffered decades of disinvestment.  
None of this would have seemed possible before President Barack Obama signed into 
law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA or Recovery Act) on  February 
17, 2009. One of the signature programs of Obama’s first term in office, this act was a $787-
billion-dollar economic stimulus package. A significant portion of the money allotted to this 
act was destined for so-called “shovel-ready” projects, with an emphasis placed on 
sustainably minded, community-focused projects. The Green Impact Zone of Missouri was 
designed to reflect that type of focus, taking on the type of projects that the Recovery Act 
favored. 
 Congressman Emmanuel Cleaver II of Missouri’s Fifth District oversaw the creation 
of the Green Impact Zone of Missouri, a non-profit organization that could apply for, receive, 
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and distribute funding that was available through the Recovery Act. His experience had 
taught him that even in a mid-size metropolis such as Kansas City, when investments get 
spread around evenly across the city, there is little measurable effect. In contrast with this 
way of doing things, his vision was to create an organization that would operate in a 
relatively small part of the city. With a smaller footprint, resources could go farther, and the 
Congressman believed that this concentration of resources would yield more significant 
results than if the same resources were sprinkled across the city or metropolitan region.  
As the headlines indicated, the Green Impact Zone of Missouri was well received by 
locals and national figures alike. Perhaps the highest profile endorsement of the initiative 
came from President Obama himself, who mentioned the Green Impact Zone in his speech 
on using sustainability as a tool for job creation and economic development, given at Smith 
Electric Vehicles in Kansas City, Missouri on July 8 2010 (White House, 2010b). Early in 
the initiative’s existence, the program was regularly praised by White House personnel, such 
as White House Office of Urban Affairs Director Adolfo Carron, Jr. and Federal Transit 
administration Deputy Administrator Therese McMillan. In the eyes of many in Kansas City 
and likely many beyond, the Green Impact Zone was as much the work of President Obama 
as it was of Congressman Emmanuel Cleaver II. 
Introduction to the Green Impact Zone 
In February 2009, Congressman Cleaver announced his idea of the Green Impact 
Zone, a 150-square-block area in Kansas City, Missouri’s east side. This area, as shown in 
Figure 1, is bounded by Troost Avenue to the west, Prospect and Swope avenues on the east, 
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39th Street to the north, and 51st Street to the south, and covers parts of five neighborhoods: 
Historic Manheim Park, 49-63/Troostwood, Ivanhoe, Blue Hills, and Town Fork Creek.  
Figure 1. Green Impact Zone Neighborhood Map. Green Impact Zone neighborhoods by 
map color: Historic Manheim Park in Orange, 49-63/Troostwood in Sky Blue, Ivanhoe in 
Blue, Blue Hills in Brick Red, and Town Fork Creek in Purple. Source: Adapted From Green 
Impact Zone of Missouri. (2013b, May). Lessons learned from outreach and engagement 
practices from the Green Impact Zone Initiative. [Green Impact Zone & EnergyworksKC 
white paper].  
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This location, which is roughly at the center of Kansas City, Missouri, is home to a 
complicated history: while it shows the scars of decades of disinvestment and racial 
segregation, it was once home to some of the most glamorous streets and boulevards in 
Kansas City’s rich history. For nearly 100 years, located less than one mile west of Troost 
Avenue (the western boundary of the Green Impact Zone) the Country Club Plaza has existed 
as a historical landmark and upscale shopping center and residential neighborhood. While a 
century has hardly diminished the appeal of the Country Club Plaza, over time the 
neighborhoods east of Troost have experienced a steady decline in investment. Today, 
despite their history and such close proximity, Troost Avenue and the neighborhoods to its 
east bear little resemblance to the County Club Plaza and its surrounding neighborhoods. 
Perhaps the only similarity that history has not been able to erode is Brush Creek: Ignorant of 
all dividing lines, Brush Creek runs through the center of the Country Club Plaza district and 
the Green Impact Zone, physical proof and a symbolic reminder of how closely related these 
two areas actually are. 
Looking inside of the area known as the Green Impact Zone, one finds that the 
present-day geography remains as complicated as its history. Before going any further, it 
should be established now that despite 150 square blocks being a relatively small area for 
such a high-profile project, it is large enough to allow for a lot of variability across the Green 
Impact Zone. Although most of this thesis discusses the Green Impact Zone as if it were a 
homogenous area, there are noticeable differences across the 150 square blocks. That being 
said, the Green Impact Zone area could be characterized overall as mostly low income, with 
a concentrated minority population, and lacking in many amenities usually present in thriving 
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neighborhoods, such as many available jobs, well-maintained infrastructure, and convenient 
access to public transportation. This is an area that, relative to the city as a whole, has higher- 
than-average rates of crime, especially violent crime. While each of these neighborhoods had 
its challenges, they had strengths that made them appealing for an experiment such as the 
Green Impact Zone. Cleaver recognized the neighborhoods for their strong leadership with 
an active grassroots community. Rather than move elsewhere, most of the residents are 
invested in their community and have a strong desire to see their neighborhood grow. 
The reasons that Congressman Cleaver settled on this 150 square-block, five-
neighborhood area on Kansas City, Missouri’s east side are not entirely clear. One could 
speculate that because the Green Impact Zone was, by its nature, supposed to be an area of 
the city that was in need of the sizable investment that Cleaver was planning, he eliminated 
the more affluent parts of the city. Beyond limiting his search for potential locations to 
distressed parts of the city, Cleaver was likely interested in putting the Green Impact Zone in 
an area where he thought it could be successful. For a grassroots, community-based project 
like this one, success would inevitably rely heavily on strong community leadership and an 
active network of residents, which these neighborhoods had. He may have shown preference 
for a part of the city that would be more visible to all residents, hoping that if the project area 
was seen on a regular basis, it would likely increase its chances of being successful, because 
generating awareness across the city would be a requirement before local investment could 
be relied upon. Also, Cleaver likely was interested in capitalizing on an area that already had 
some forward momentum, because individual projects are less likely to receive attention than 
a series of related, complementary investments.  
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Methodology 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the full scope of the Green Impact Zone 
initiative and to evaluate the Green Impact Zone model as a national prototype for place-
based urban stimulus. To do this, the thesis examines the philosophical and historical 
precedents on which the Green Impact Zone was based, the history of Kansas City with 
special attention given to the area that would become the Green Impact Zone, and the 
complete history of the Green Impact Zone.  
 Primary source data for the thesis came largely from regular, periodically published 
progress reports from the Green Impact Zone. Other primary source documents included 
websites, local newspaper and magazine coverage, and personal interviews conducted by the 
author during the first half of 2016. Interviewees were assured anonymity in exchange for 
greater honesty and transparency in their answers. Their relationships to the Green Impact 
Zone varied widely, from residents living in the area, to area organizers, politicians, and even 
members of the Green Impact Zone initiative itself. Secondary sources, including books and 
journal articles, helped to put these primary sources into context and provide a greater 
historical and philosophical perspective on the Green Impact Zone. 
Introduction to the Green Impact Zone Model 
I became familiar with the inner workings of the Green Impact Zone when, in 2012, I 
began a student internship with the Zone. This was an opportunity to put into practice my 
studies in University of Missouri-Kansas City’s Department of Geosciences with an 
organization that was doing community work near my home. The Green Impact Zone’s 
combination of environmental awareness, place-based development strategies, and socially 
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progressive policies made it a natural fit for the type of initiatives that I hoped a Masters in 
Urban Geography would lead me to. It was not until the Green Impact Zone initiative ended 
in 2014 that I decided the history of this unique experiment needed to be documented, and 
the model that the Green Impact Zone was promoting needed to be evaluated.  
 Even though the Green Impact Zone had officially closed its doors when I started 
work on this thesis, I knew that attempting to label it a success or a failure would be 
premature, because it would take years before many of the effects of the initiative could be 
measured. It would be much more valuable, then, for this thesis to focus on the process of 
creating and operating the Green Impact Zone and to examine more closely what the 
experience of the Green Impact Zone was like for those who went through it. In the spirit of 
the Green Impact Zone, which always aimed to put the neighborhood residents at the center 
of everything it undertook, I thought this thesis should also put the spotlight on the people 
who made the Green Impact Zone possible. That is why over the course of 2016 I 
corresponded with people who engaged with the Green Impact Zone at all levels: residents of 
the neighborhoods, neighborhood leaders, Green Impact Zone employees, people holding 
elected office in Kansas City, and private-sector leaders working within the boundaries of the 
Green Impact Zone. Although I contacted 20 people to ask their opinions, I was only able to 
engage with 12 of them. They spoke with me on a variety of topics pertaining to the Green 
Impact Zone’s formation, model, successes and failures, and the legacy of the Green Impact 
Zone. 
 Through these discussions and the other work of this thesis, my perceptions of the 
Green Impact Zone changed. The model that was once heralded as a revolutionary new 
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approach to community development started to seem like less of a departure from other 
programs as it was being developed and implemented. In many ways, the Green Impact Zone 
looked like a new attempt at a well-established model of place-based development. The 
Green Impact Zone model, like effective place-based models of the past, takes a holistic 
approach to changing the fortunes of a neighborhood by simultaneously addressing multiple 
causes of disinvestment. From the Green Impact Zone’s website: “Successful community 
redevelopment requires that the multiple causes of disinvestment be tackled simultaneously. 
Investment in the physical infrastructure of the community cannot bring about transformation 
without also investing in the human fabric of the community” (Green Impact Zone of 
Missouri, 2016c, para. 4).  
 If there was anything revolutionary about the Green Impact Zone model, it was the 
number of different people and organizations that were represented throughout the process. 
In many ways, the Green Impact Zone’s history begins in the Oval Office with President 
Obama’s vision for a place-based, urban-neighborhood-focused economic recovery. Then, 
the leadership that Congressman Emmanuel Cleaver II showed in anticipating the 
opportunity that was being afforded in this critical “federal moment” allowed neighborhood 
leaders to participate in the shaping of the Green Impact Zone’s goals, values, and initiatives 
from a very early stage. Residents were engaged early in this process too, which ensured that 
the Green Impact Zone represented the interests and concerns of the residents from day one, 
something that few federal-, state-, or even city-initiated programs can claim. The Green 
Impact Zone continued to show a commitment to putting the residents’ needs first throughout 
the process, going to great lengths to make sure that anyone living inside its boundaries knew 
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what work was being done and that anyone who wanted to have his or her voice heard had an 
opportunity to participate. The history of the initiative also shows that the Zone’s leaders 
took this input seriously and were willing to change their priorities so that they matched the 
changing interests that the residents expressed.  
Thesis Organization 
 Chapter 2, titled Literature Review, surveys the literature required for an evaluation 
of the Green Impact Zone, which includes the discussion in urban policy over people vs. 
place-based development, the history of federal urban policy in America (especially as it 
relates to concentrated poverty, racial segregation, and place-based approaches to tackling 
these problems), and the intersection of geographical theory and social justice. Chapter 3, 
titled A History of Inequality in Kansas City, examines the historical context of racial 
segregation and spatial discrimination in Kansas City. This history of unjust policies led to 
the neighborhood conditions that the Green Impact Zone was designed to counter. Chapter 4 
is called The Green Impact Zone of Missouri and is a historical documentation of Green 
Impact Zone’s timeline, including its formation, sources of funding, programs, and 
investments. It gives the reader the opportunity to see the complete history of the Green 
Impact Zone and compares the goals that the Green Impact Zone began with to the actual 
accomplishments of the initiative. Chapter 5, called Reflections on the Green Impact Zone of 
Missouri, is inspired by conversations and interviews with individuals who participated in the 
Green Impact Zone. Much of this chapter is composed of direct quotes from these 
conversations, and the rest is a summarizing or rephrasing of thoughts shared during these 
conversations. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter about the totality of the Green 
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Impact Zone. It summarizes the major findings of the thesis and suggests additional research 
that could be done on the topic. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In 1933, President of the United States of America Franklin D. Roosevelt spent his 
first 100 days in office producing a record number of bills for Congress to review. The New 
Deal, Roosevelt’s comprehensive plan to pull America out of the Great Depression, cost 
about $50 billion in federal expenditures from 1933 to 1940 (Powell, 2009).  
 When Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009, the United States of America 
was in the biggest economic crisis since Roosevelt had been president. Three weeks after his 
inauguration, Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
Referred to as the “New New Deal” by presidential historian Michael Grunwald, the ARRA 
had a lot in common with the legislation from Roosevelt’s time in office (Grunwald, 2012). 
In an interview with David Plotz, Grunwald stated, 
The Obama team thought a lot about the New Deal while they were putting the 
stimulus together, but times have changed since the New Deal…Christina Romer, the 
Depression scholar who led Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers (2008-2009), 
kept reminding colleagues that the Roosevelt administration hired four million 
Americans in the winter of 1934. (Plotz, 2012, para. 8) 
 
The Obama administration understood how unworkable a number like that is to achieve 
today. A project such as the Hoover Dam, which employed roughly 5,000 Americans in the 
1930s, today would only employ “a few hundred workers with heavy equipment” (Plotz, 
2012, para. 8).  
 The President elected to direct the money (now estimated to be about $831 billion 
over the period of 2009-2019) towards purportedly “shovel ready projects,” or, in other 
words, a project that was ready to begin within 90 days of funding approval (Congressional 
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Budget Office, 2012, p. 1). This approach matched the administration’s goal to “leverage 
investments by focusing resources in targeted places and drawing on the compounding effect 
of well-coordinated action” (White House, 2009, para. 3). 
 In other words, the White House’s strategy for generating employment and economic 
recovery was based on the value of timely, effective place-based investment. The Green 
Impact Zone of Missouri was created out of this commitment to place-based solutions. The 
footprint of the Green Impact Zone was parts of five distressed inner-city Kansas City 
neighborhoods that make up the 150-square-block area from 39th Street to the north, 51st 
Street to the south, Troost Avenue to the west, and Prospect Avenue and Swope Parkway to 
the east. This initiative was created as a direct response to the announcement of the ARRA 
and was framed by proponents as “Kansas City, Missouri’s community plan for the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009” (“Green Impact Zone of Missouri: 
Kansas City, Missouri’s Community Plan for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009,” n.d.). Congressman Emanuel Cleaver, II (D-MO, Fifth District), who is credited 
with initiating the idea of the Green Impact Zone, hoped that it would come to be known as 
“the Obama administration’s Poster Child as a stimulus on steroids” (“Green Impact Zone of 
Missouri: Kansas City, Missouri’s Community Plan,” n.d.). 
Concentrated Poverty, People, and Place 
 In popular American culture, there is an accepted image of the blighted central city 
surrounded by wealthy, white suburbs. This simplistic image is problematic, but it also has 
value. The makeup of central cities and their nearby suburbs are constantly changing, 
especially recently. More Americans are choosing to live in central cities than in recent 
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decades: according to 2013 Census Data summarized in USA Today, “The nation’s metro 
areas grew by about 2.3 million to 269.9 million people” and “About three in four metro 
areas gained population between 2012 and 2013—of 381, only 92 lost population” (Toppo & 
Overberg, 2014 para. 13-14). According to William H. Frey, Senior Fellow of Metropolitan 
Policy Program at the Brookings Institute, for each of the last three years, cities with 
populations exceeding 250,000 grew at rates exceeding 1 percent—far higher than their 
average annual rate of 0.49 percent over the 2000-2010 decade. He also pointed out that 
when comparing the cities to their suburbs, the previous decades’ trend of greater growth in 
the suburbs has recently reversed. In 2012-2013, 19 of the 51 major metropolitan areas 
showed faster growth in the primary city than in the suburbs (Frey, 2014). 
Although the overall makeup of American downtowns may be changing, the image of 
a blighted area surrounded by affluence may still be an accurate portrait of where many poor 
Americans live. According to Alan Berube, Carey Nadeau, and Elizabeth Kneebone (2011),  
After declining in the 1990s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods—
where at least 40% of individuals live below the poverty line—rose by one-third from 
2000 to 2005-09. By the end of the period, 10.5% of poor people nationwide lived in 
such neighborhoods, up from 9.1% in 2000, but still well below the 14.1% rate in 
1990. (para. 3) 
 
In Kansas City, the number of people living in extreme poverty tracts increased from 
16,450 in 2005 to 52,030 in 2009; according to the same paper, the 2009 concentrated 
poverty rate in Kansas City’s city limits was 20.5% (Berube et al., 2011).1 Concentrated 
poverty is not limited to urban centers either:  
                                                          
1 Extreme-Poverty Tracts are defined as census tracts with poverty rates of 40% and over. Concentrated Poverty 
Rate is defined as the share of the poor population living in extreme poverty tracts. Source: Brookings 
Institution analysis of 2005-09 American Community Survey five-year estimates. 
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The population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods rose more than twice as fast in 
suburbs as in cities from 2000 to 2005-09. The same is true of poor residents in 
extreme-poverty tracts, who increased by 41% in suburbs, compared to 17% in cities. 
However, poor people in cities remain more than four times as likely to live in 
concentrated poverty as their suburban counterparts. (Berube et al., 2011) 
 
Kansas City area suburbs didn’t suffer from much poverty during the study years; only one 
census tract in the suburbs was an extreme poverty tract compared to 28 in the Kansas City 
city limits, and the concentrated poverty rate was only 1.5% in the suburbs between 2005 and 
2009 (Berube et al., 2011). 
Having established that poverty is unevenly distributed across communities in the 
United States, it might seem logical that the most direct way to assist residents living in these 
areas is to assist these areas themselves. Not so, say many in the field of community 
development, who argue against these place-based programs in favor of assistance going 
directly to those individuals in need, who then are free or even encouraged to relocate to 
more middle-class parts of the city. The debate between place-based and people-based 
income redistribution is considered to be one of the oldest debates within community 
development (Crane & Manville, 2008).  
Although elements of this debate likely go back further, the first scholar to use the 
phrase “place prosperity vs. people prosperity” was Louis Winnick, a housing economist 
with the Ford Foundation. In his paper, “Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity: Welfare 
Considerations in the Geographic Redistribution of Economic Activity,” Winnick (1966) 
compared the strengths and weaknesses of place-based with people-based policies. He saw a 
necessary dichotomy “between the ideal of improving the welfare of deserving people as 
individuals, regardless of where they live, and the ideal of improving the welfare of groups 
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of deserving people defined by their spatial proximity in ‘places’” (italics in original) 
(Winnick, as cited in Bolton, 1992, p. 187). These differing ideologies yield different 
redistribution mechanisms; the people-based policies utilize direct transfer of payments. This 
method also allows recipients the freedom to move without losing aid. Place-based policies, 
on the other hand, invest in an area’s infrastructure using grants, subsidies, or expenditures in 
human capital (Bolton, 1992). Winnick (1966) ultimately came down against place-based 
policies, calling them “at best… clumsy, expensive, and often inequitable devices” (p. 280). 
Put simply, Winnick believed that because places are hardly ever homogeneous, investing in 
a place will result in some of the money going to individuals who are less deserving.  
 The criticism of place-based policies remains very similar even today. The most well-
known “anti-place-based” scholar of the last decade is Edward Glaeser, a Harvard economist, 
who argues against investing money in cities such as New Orleans and Buffalo (2005, 2007). 
In the case of New Orleans, he argues that the federal government should be insuring the 
people who live somewhere, and not the place itself. So, rather than spending $200 billion on 
infrastructure, he would rather see residents receive $200,000 each to either rebuild or 
relocate. New Orleans, according to Glaeser, has been declining and its people have been 
mired in poverty for decades; its port and pipelines cannot support the workforce of a large 
city, and $200 billion is unlikely to change that. His view on Buffalo’s future is similarly 
grim: too much money, argues Glaeser, has already been spent on Buffalo, New York, and 
the median family income in 2007 was less than 60% of the nationwide figure of $55,000. He 
argues that Buffalo once benefited from its proximity to water and to New York City, but 
these advantages are no longer valuable enough to keep the city afloat. Changing technology, 
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declining human capital, and an unwelcoming climate have also contributed to Buffalo’s 
decline. 
According to Randall Crane and Michael Manville, urban planning professors at 
UCLA, Glaeser’s arguments against the use of place-based programs fall into three main 
categories: targeting, coverage, and mobility (Crane & Manville, 2008). Problems of 
targeting are problems in which “place-oriented strategies invest resources [with] no 
guarantee that the resources actually reach distressed people” (p. 4). In other words, he 
argues that resources often end up going to non-poor residents. Coverage deals with “what 
proportion of the poor or unemployed is helped by the intervention?” Crane and Manville 
summarize this argument by explaining that it is quite likely that targeting one neighborhood 
comes at the expense of another neighborhood that may be home to many equally poor 
residents. The third concept, mobility, states that rewarding people for staying in an 
impoverished area is a contradiction. Glaeser sees place-based policies as promoting a 
situation in which someone receives aid for remaining somewhere “that does not serve his or 
her interests.” This line of reasoning leads to the criticism that “at its worst, a place-based 
policy encourages people to stay when they might be better off going” (Crane & Manville, 
2008, p. 4). 
 Evaluating the values of place-based and people-based policies becomes more 
difficult when considering “the dual nature of community economic development” write 
Crane and Manville (2008, p. 2). Most people understand that individuals’ well-being is 
partially attributable to the well-being of their neighborhood. Treating an individual’s lack of 
“adequate private resources such as food, job skills, jobs, inexpensive transportation, 
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affordable housing, or adequate income” is most directly done through direct transfer 
payments to said individual. If the only goal of a policy is to provide resources to an ailing 
individual or household, well executed people-based programs provide more return on 
investments (Crane & Manville, 2008, p. 2).  
 Place, however, plays a large role in why generations of people are trapped in 
poverty. According to Crane and Manville (2008), “lack of [individual] resources may be the 
main problem of low-income persons, but it is not their only problem. Their neighborhoods 
also tend to lack resources, as evidenced by neglected infrastructure, underperforming 
schools, and insufficient police protection” (p. 2). They continue,  
Thus a second broad category of community development challenges is characterized 
by spatial market failures, where specific places experience underinvestment and 
inadequate provision of spatial public goods, including safety, education, transit, 
community identity, political networks, and the spatial externalities of geographically 
linked housing and labor markets. (Crane & Manville, 2008, p. 2) 
 
These considerations force policymakers and urban theorists to consider the possibility that 
there are two somewhat separate, albeit complementary, issues concurrently holding people 
in poverty. Direct transfers, or in other words, people-based policies, could represent a 
comprehensive solution “if the individual recipients simply move to places with better public 
services. But not all individuals will want or be able to do this” (Crane & Manville, 2008, 
p. 3).  
 Outside of the great work of Crane and Manville, many others have constructed 
arguments that favor place-based policies based on “second best” and “public-goods” 
arguments. Second-best situations are premised around the notion that place-based aid is the 
best available way to provide assistance because the ideal option is infeasible. If we are 
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comparing two policies of providing aid to people in poverty, it is often easier and cheaper to 
give aid to people in a specific area than it is to attempt to identify every individual who 
qualifies for aid. Next, a public good is a non-excludable and non-rivalrous good, meaning 
that it is not possible to prevent people from access to this good (non-excludable), nor will 
one person’s use of the good hinder another’s use of the good (non-rivalrous). Public-goods 
arguments, therefore, argue that effective place-based programs invest in infrastructure that 
everyone has access to, which will benefit a larger population than individual aid would 
(Crane & Manville, 2008, pp. 5-6). 
 Although both the second-best and public-goods arguments are valid, there are more 
nuanced cases to be made for place-based policies as well. Roger Bolton (1992), an Emeritus 
Professor of Economics as Williams College, recognized that “a sense of community in a 
specific geographical setting… represents valuable capital” (p. 188). He drew directly from 
earlier works by Gordon L. Clark (Clark & Gertler, 1983), economic and environmental 
geographer at Oxford University, that argued against forms of aid that “forced people to 
migrate by putting them into situations where they have no real choice but to move” (Bolton, 
1992, p. 192). When we invest in a place, we are helping to preserve and even promote a 
sense of community. This sense of community, in turn, drives people to commit time and 
money to maintaining and improving their community. Policies that promote sense of place 
should be encouraged, and policies that undermine community ties should be avoided.  
The National Research Council et al. (2002) oversaw a study called Community and 
Quality of Life: Data Needs for Informed Decision Making, with the purpose of identifying 
indicators of livability in a given place and developing ways of using data to measure these 
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indicators. In the chapter titled “The Importance of Place and Connectedness,” they discuss 
how community can arise, the complicated relationship between place and space, and why a 
place benefits from a strong sense of community: 
On the other hand, in many places a strong sense of community does develop. Often 
it arises from people’s convictions about what the place is not and where it is not, as 
well as what it is (Allen et al., 1998, p. 82). This is an example of a more general 
principle that aspects of the unique and specific character of a place do not depend 
solely on the internal history of that place but also on the relations between that place 
and other places. The character of a place results from “a distinct mixture [italics in 
original] of wider and more local social relations,” so that an understanding of sense 
of place “can only be constructed by linking that place to places beyond” (Massey, 
1993, p. 68)…. A strong sense of community, often considered an essential part of a 
sense of place, is a form of social capital and sometimes an important positive 
element in livability (Bolton, 1992). (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 
and Medicine, 2002, pp. 66-67) 
 
 Without referencing Roger Bolton or Gordon L. Clark, the late John O. Calmore, a 
law professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, also argued against policies 
that result in the fragmentation of existing communities. Somewhat surprisingly, Calmore 
was writing to express his displeasure towards seemingly liberal policies designed to 
encourage racial integration. He wrote that policies that use aid to encourage relocation “fail 
to see the importance of maintaining a centralized black community” (Calmore, 1992, 
p. 1494). He favored “spatial equality,” which “focuses on opportunity and circumstances 
within black communities and demands that both be improved, enriched, and equalized” 
(Calmore 1992, p. 1495). Calmore’s essay recognized the same value in a sense of place that 
Bolton argued for, and Calmore concluded that by policymakers overlooking the value of 
place-based programs, some Americans (mostly minorities) have inadequate access to a 
neighborhood that can provide them a sense of community.  
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 One can hear the similarities between the statements made by Calmore and Bolton, 
and the earlier observations made by Crane and Manville that not all individuals will be able 
to, nor will they want to, move to a location simply because it offers superior services and 
facilities. This point, which is critical to understanding the value of effective place-based 
policies (including the Green Impact Zone of Missouri), was perhaps made best by the late 
Edward Soja, a geographer who for many years was an urban planning professor at the 
University of California at Los Angeles. In his recent work Seeking Spatial Justice (2010) (a 
book which features prominently throughout this thesis), Soja acknowledges the terrible role 
that segregation has played in the creation and continuation of injustice, but he then writes, 
“again, as with all forms of locational discrimination, the issue is complicated by the 
interplay of endogenous and exogenous influences and by the complex relations between 
geographies of choice and geographies of privilege” (Italics are Soja’s) (Soja, 2010, p. 55). 
He expounds:  
Not all examples of residential segregation are entirely unjust. To some degree, 
residential segregation can be voluntary and beneficial, with people of similar 
background choosing to live together for many different purposes, from creating 
identity and community to eating preferred food and obtaining other forms of 
nourishment and cultural sustenance to helping new arrivals to find jobs and housing. 
Segregation becomes a problem, however, when it is rigidly imposed from above as a 
form of subjugation and control . . . or when it emerges less intentionally as an 
oppressive by-product of unregulated “freedoms” of choice operating within 
persistent spatial structures of advantage. (Soja, 2010, p. 55) 
 
He concludes his remarks on this topic:  
Rather than being inherently characterized as good or bad, they need to be seen 
contextually as arising from underlying spatial structures and structurings of 
locational advantage and disadvantage. It is the task of theoretically informed spatial 
practice to bring these structures of privilege, whether based on race, class, gender, 
ethnicity, sexual preference, disability, or any other form of hierarchical control and 
21 
 
domination, more clearly and cogently to the surface, to greater public awareness. 
(Soja, 2010, pp. 55-56) 
 
In no way do I intend to downplay the disastrous effects of racial segregation in 
Kansas City or elsewhere. However, people should not be so determined to acknowledge the 
harm of segregation that they dismiss outright the potential value of voluntary residential-
association with people like themselves. When a place-based initiative (such as the Green 
Impact Zone) is at its best, it is operating with a thorough understanding of the desires and 
feelings of the residents it represents. Often, one of the first (and most important) steps in 
addressing concentrated poverty is capitalizing on residents’ emotional investment in the fate 
of their community. Furthermore, only place-based initiatives, not people-based initiatives, 
are equipped to bring these discriminatory structures of privilege to greater public awareness. 
These points, arguably, represent the greatest weakness of relying entirely on people-based 
policies; people-based policies have not shown an acute understanding of the power of 
identity and community. At worst, direct transfers such as housing vouchers offer recipients 
two undesirable outcomes—displacement or disenfranchisement (or perhaps both)—and too 
often, even good people-based programs do nothing to capitalize on and promote the 
transformative potential of community.  
Federal Urban Policy 
 Although the history of Federal urban policy does not often contain the most effective 
examples of either people- or place-based policies, it does address the deteriorated conditions 
of American cities and the conditions that necessitate the debate between people- and place-
based policies. Throughout the last 50 years, American presidents have adopted policies that 
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vacillated between endorsements of people-based urban policies, place-based urban policies, 
and virtually complete neglect of urban centers. 
In the wake of riots in Los Angeles and Chicago (in 1965 and 1966, respectively), 
and before riots in Newark (in 1967), President Lyndon Johnson in 1966 formed the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders with the purpose of understanding what could be 
done to reduce the risk of future rioting. This Commission produced one report, in which it 
identified segregation, ghettos, and feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness as “prime 
components of the ‘explosive mixture’” (United States, National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 10). The Commission declared that the only acceptable course of 
action was one that “combines ghetto enrichment with programs designed to encourage 
integration of substantial numbers of Negroes into the society outside the ghetto” (United 
States, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 19). 
 In response to this report and the rioting in major cities, Johnson strengthened the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development by giving it the authority to prosecute 
discriminatory housing practices as identified in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (also known as 
the Fair Housing Act). The Fair Housing Act, along with The Model Cities Program (1966-
1974), constituted the majority of Johnson’s federal urban policy (Schechter, 2011, p. 1). 
They “sought to make over blighted urban neighborhoods by directing funds to 
demonstration projects” using “federal partnerships, primarily with community groups” 
(Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 5). By focusing too much on the perceived deterioration of 
minority areas of cities, these programs failed to comprise a comprehensive urban policy.  
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The Nixon and Ford administrations foretold the urban policy that would exist 
throughout the 1980s and up through today. Their administrations downplayed the role that 
federal policy plays in the success or failure of cities, arguing that the problems in cities 
simply cannot be solved by Washington. Urban policy focusing on central cities was 
abandoned in favor of policies that spread urban grants over a much broader area, including 
the suburbs. “Eventually, Nixon abandoned any specifically urban approach to policymaking 
for a ‘national growth’ strategy” (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 5). According to the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD.gov, 2014),  
on August 22, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford signed a law creating one of HUD’s 
hallmark programs – the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program. 
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 merged seven 
individual competitive grant programs into a block grant providing local communities 
the flexibility to decide for themselves how best to meet their own community 
development needs. (para. 1) 
 
Although this program has been very successful, investing $144 billion to activities 
such as providing community resources and low-cost housing, this money was not limited to 
urban communities, nor was it limited to distressed communities. 
President Jimmy Carter saw declining cities and regions as a critical issue, and he 
worked to pioneer the nation’s first comprehensive urban agenda. Conservative 
Congressional resistance to Carter’s policies made its implementation difficult. The Urban 
America in the Eighties report for the Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties 
declared that “government should not squander resources in a futile attempt to counter the 
market’s strain toward efficiency by promoting economic development and growth in 
distressed central cities” (Eisinger, 1985, p. 14). The report advocated the removal of all 
federal place-based programs, including “economic development, community development, 
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public facilities investment, housing, transportation, and development planning” (Moroz & 
Petro, 2009, p. 6). What legislation Carter was able to push through, however, ended up 
looking similar to the Johnson administration’s urban initiatives: money directly channeled to 
urban areas experiencing the most distress. 
When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he did for cities what the 
conservatives had been trying to make Carter do: nothing that would require federal 
investment of tax dollars. Referred to as “benign neglect,” this federal policy of removing aid 
while simultaneously providing extensive tax breaks to private investment was the beginning 
of a neoliberal urban policy that has dominated federal government policies ever since. 
Under Reagan, direct aid to cities dropped from 28% to 17% and categorical grants were cut 
by 25% (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 6). Aside from working to cut spending, Reagan’s central 
urban policy was the creation of Enterprise Zones (EZs). Based on the belief that poverty can 
be alleviated by attracting more private enterprise to a distressed area, EZs are place-based 
policies that offer major subsidies to any business that locates in a designated area. EZs have 
been criticized since their introduction for guaranteeing that “the most certain gains accrue to 
those least in need, while the least certain gains accrue to those most in need” (Crane & 
Manville, 2008, p. 4). 
After cities had suffered eight years of benign neglect from the Reagan 
administration, George H.W. Bush became president in 1989 and changed little regarding 
urban policy. In 1992 when the Rodney King Riots broke out in Los Angeles, there was hope 
that Bush would be forced to develop and promote a more proactive urban agenda. On 
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November 1, 1992, The Houston Chronicle ran a piece titled “Post-riot Urban Aid Agenda 
Forgotten on Campaign Trail,” which described the hopefulness with this compelling quote: 
For one fleeting moment, it was as if a window had flown wide open after being 
frozen shut for years. Political leaders dusted off the hoary notion of an urban agenda. 
The nightly news bristled with tales from the inner city. Many Americans hoped that, 
somehow, the stubborn dilemmas of crime and poverty that so dehumanize urban life 
would be tackled with a renewed public will. (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 8) 
 
Despite an attempt by Congress and HUD Secretary Jack Kemp to capitalize on the 
groundswell of popular support for a new urban agenda, Bush vetoed the urban policy 
legislation when it reached his desk (Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992, H.R. 
4210, 102nd Congress, 1992). 
The Clinton administration (1993-2001) represented a departure, albeit a small one, 
from the previous dozen years of Reagan’s and Bush’s benign neglect. One incremental 
change was Clinton’s decision to transition from Enterprise Zones to “empowerment zones” 
and “enterprise communities.” These represented a skillful overlapping of “social service 
block grants with tax breaks for economic development” (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 7). A 
comparison of the amount of federal aid given to cities reinforces Clinton’s reputation for the 
status-quo: “federal aid to cities dropped from 17.5% of city general revenue in 1977 to 5.0% 
in 1990, but had increased only incrementally by 2000 to 5.4%” (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 8). 
The incremental gains that had been won during the Clinton years were quickly erased when 
George W. Bush took office in 2001. Bush cut funding for Community Development Block 
Grants by about 7% and even attempted to eliminate them entirely. Like presidents Reagan 
through Clinton, George W. Bush promoted market solutions as the centerpiece to his federal 
urban-policy program (Moroz & Petro, 2009, p. 8). 
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Federal urban policy was reformed under President Barack Obama and was not based 
on prevailing models of urban rehabilitation or benign neglect. Rather than justifying urban 
investment as a stopgap against urban conflagration, Obama’s policies viewed cities as 
drivers of our national economy. Urban expenditure, therefore, was not an emergency 
measure but a measured investment: “the economic health and social vitality of our urban 
communities are critically important to the prosperity and quality of life for Americans” 
(Executive Order 13503: Establishment of the White House Office of Urban Affairs, 2009, 
Section 1). This commitment to American cities had been a hallmark of the Obama 
administration since the first weeks of his presidency. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was signed into law on February 17, 
2009, and two days after that, Obama established the White House Office of Urban Affairs. 
Later that year, the Office of Sustainable Housing and Communities was created within 
HUD, and the Interagency Council on Sustainable Communities was created as a stand-alone 
task force. With so much money being made available through the ARRA, the roles of the 
Office of Urban Affairs, Office of Sustainable Housing, and Interagency Council on 
Sustainable Communities were to make sure that money was being spent on high-impact 
projects that would balance growth with social and environmental equity. The Obama 
administration made a priority of promoting place-based investments as examples of high-
impact projects. According to a 2010 memorandum,  
effective place-based policies can influence how rural and metropolitan areas 
develop, how well they function as places to live, work, operate a business, preserve 
heritage, and more. Such policies also leverage investments by focusing resources in 
targeted places and drawing on the compounding effect of cooperative effort. (White 
House, 2010a, para. 1). 
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Geography and Social Justice 
The word “justice” appears in nearly all of the works discussed in this section. 
Although the word is used to convey a fairly consistent set of principles, the exact meaning 
of the word likely differs from source to source. In fact, one of the most active dialogues in 
the fields of geography and social justice is about the definition and usage of the word 
justice. Because it is not the purpose of this paper to make normative statements pertaining to 
justice or social justice, and because this paper does not require an exact definition of the 
word justice, the works in this section will not be evaluated in an attempt to understand 
exactly what that word means in each of them.  
To establish a general principle of justice for this paper, we may turn to Edward 
Soja’s Seeking Spatial Justice. He explains that social justice “expands beyond the 
boundaries of the law to discuss general principles of fairness and democracy, and the rights 
and responsibilities attached to being a member of a particular social group, whether or not 
they are legally defined as such” (Soja, 2010, p. 74).  
Even though the Green Impact Zone did not use the word “justice” in any of its 
literature, it certainly was focused on promoting values such as democracy, citizenship, and 
fundamental human rights. The Green Impact Zone of Missouri, in a sense, is an example of 
an organization that translated the theoretical principles of geography and social justice into 
practice.  
David M. Smith’s (1973), The Geography of Social Well-Being in the United States: 
An Introduction to Territorial Social Indicators, is perhaps the first notable work by a 
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modern geographer to provide a geographic understanding of social problems such as 
poverty, health care delivery, environmental quality, and quality of life. The work is 
considered to come from the Chicago school of human ecologists in that it is basically 
concerned with describing the spatial pattern found in the U.S. for a number of factors 
thought to have significant bearing on the level of well-being. (Girt, 1974, para. 2) 
 
The short book uses statistical methods to explore spatial patterns of factors thought to have 
an effect on the well-being of a given place. 
In 1977, Coates, Johnston, and Knox published the first major text on “the empirical 
measurement, description, and interpretation of the geographical patterning of social injustice 
and inequality” (Soja, 2010, p. 82). In this work, the authors described the dearth of 
publications applying geographical techniques to inequality: “Unfortunately, geographers 
have traditionally ignored social problems such as [inequality] almost completely” (Coates et 
al., 1977, p. 5). This book comes from the quantitative analysis school of geographic thought 
and seeks to outline a toolkit for quantifying inequality at the international, intra-national, 
and intra-urban levels. The authors’ emphasis on empiricism is clear when they write that 
their goal is to help geographers “to establish the extent to which these inequalities are 
dependent upon locational considerations and reflected in spatial patterns” (Coates et al., 
1977, pp. 5-6). 
The most notable authors to have expanded the quantitative approach to urban justice 
are the sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton. In American Apartheid: Segregation 
and the Making of the Underclass, they wrote that their  
fundamental argument is that racial segregation – and its characteristic institutional 
form, the black ghetto – are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation 
of black poverty in the United States. Residential segregation is the principal 
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organizational feature of American society that is responsible for the creation of the 
urban underclass. (Massey & Denton, 1993, p. 9) 
 
This book is credited with popularizing the term “hypersegregation,” which occurs 
when “a group is so segregated that its members have little chance of contact with outsiders 
… in the case of residential locations, hypersegregation means that the members of different 
groups are extremely unlikely to live together” (Parrillo, 2008, p. 436). To qualify as 
hypersegregated, a group must rank very highly on at least four of five segregation indices at 
once. These five indices, which Massey and Denton created by consolidating 20 existing 
segregation measures, are: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering 
(Massey & Denton, 1993, p. 74) 2. As of 2010, Kansas City remained one of 21 
hypersegregated metropolitan areas in the United States (Massey & Tannen, 2015). 
The greatest contributions to the field of geographical social justice come from 
radical and critical geographers. Critical geography is the application of critical theory to 
geographical study. Despite diverse epistemological, ontological, and methodological 
approaches, critical geography can be characterized as (among other things): rooted in 
Marxist theory; a rejection of empiricism in favor of social theory; focused on emancipatory 
politics and social change; committed to social justice; and giving attention to space as a 
critical tool (Gregory et al., 2009, pp. 123-127). An attempt to define the field of radical 
geography is more difficult than defining critical geography. Often, critical theory would fall 
under the larger umbrella of radical thought, but in the field of geography, it is a bit more 
                                                          
2 Evenness refers to the distribution of groups across neighborhoods according to their proportion in a given 
city. Exposure refers to the probability that members of a group will have any form of interaction with other 
groups. Concentration refers to how much space a minority group occupies. Centralization refers to how close 
to the center of an urban area a group lives. Clustering refers to the extent to which a group lives in contiguous 
or adjoining neighborhoods (Parillo, 2008, p. 464). 
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complicated because the self-declared group of critical geographers pre-dates self-declared 
radical geographers, and many current works in the field of radical geography draw heavily 
on works by self-declared critical geographers. If we take the description of the journal 
Antipode, the seminal publication in the field of radical geography, to be a fair assessment of 
the field, it can be described as “Marxist/socialist/ anarchist/anti-racist/feminist/queer/green 
analysis of geographical issues and whose intent is to engender the development of a new 
and better society” (Antipode Foundation, n.d.). For the purposes of this paper, these two 
fields can be considered interchangeable. 
Both fields, especially with regard to their works on urban justice, would draw 
significant inspiration from pioneering French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri 
Lefebvre. His 1968 book Le Droit à la ville (The Right to the City), “was packed with 
powerful ideas about the consequential geography of urban life and the need for those most 
negatively affected by the urban condition to take greater control over the social production 
of urbanized space” (Soja, 2010, p. 6). Lefebvre envisioned the right to the city as a 
simultaneous right to access and decision making:  
It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the 
space and time of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the 
use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos 
(for workers, immigrants, the “marginal” and even for the “privileged”). (Lefebvre, 
2000, p. 34) 
 
David Harvey, who has referenced Lefebvre and The Right to the City throughout his 
career, explained the slogan as,  
far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change 
ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual 
right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective 
power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our 
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cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of 
our human rights. (Harvey, 2008, p. 23) 
 
Five years after Lefebvre published Le Droit à la ville, Harvey’s Social Justice and 
the City defined and then redefined the field of social justice geography. In the first section, 
titled “Liberal Formulations,” Harvey showed how individual city functions such as markets 
for land, labor, and housing naturally favor the wealthy and powerful. The alternative to 
inequitable geographies and regressive investments was “territorial justice,” which Harvey 
defined as “just distribution of social resources justly arrived at.”3 He believed that this 
would be achieved by adopting a policy that, in the words of Edward Soja, allocated 
resources to create “positive (socially beneficial) spillover or multiplier effects from the 
locational or spatial pattern of public and private investments and where special attention is 
given to redress unusual environmental problems” (Soja, 2010, pp. 85-86). Soja explained 
that “this approach steers the search for justice toward access to the positive effects 
emanating from the urban economy, akin to the right to the city idea, and toward 
fundamental questions of environmental justice and social democracy” (Soja, 2010, 
pp. 85-86). 
The second section of Harvey’s Social Justice boldly changed gears and introduced 
his “socialist formulations” to the discussion. Harvey grew discouraged about the chances 
that capitalism could be reformed to accommodate the policies proposed in “liberal 
formulations” and was drawn towards Marxist thought. Like his previous section, Harvey 
                                                          
3 The term “regressive investments” here uses the definition of the word regressive as it is used in the term 
“regressive tax.” A regressive tax is a tax that takes a larger percentage of income from low-income earners 
than from high-income earners. The Social Security tax, with its cap on what one must pay, is regressive. 
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again showed how a city naturally functions unjustly and yields unjust outcomes, this time 
providing no policy recommendations. Intellectuals, said Harvey, must lead the resistance: 
This immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious and aware 
construction of a new paradigm for the social geographic thought through a deep and 
profound critique of our existing analytical constructs… our task is to mobilize our 
powers of thought to formulate concepts and categories, theories and arguments, 
which we can apply to the task of bringing about a humanizing social change. 
(Harvey, 1973, p. 145) 
 
In one essay in the “socialist formulations” section, “Revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary theory in geography and the problem of ghetto formation,” Harvey called for 
“nothing less than a wholesale rejection of the way human geographers both studied cities 
and thought about solving urban social problems” (Hubbard & Kitchin, 2011, p. 235). 
Harvey has supervised many doctoral students who have made major contributions to 
the field of human geography, including Neil Smith (Uneven Development: Nature, Capital 
and the Production of Space, 1984; Democracy, States, and the Struggle for Global Justice, 
2008) and Erik Swyngedouw (La Crisis del Abastecimiento de Agua en Guayaquil, 1995; 
Liquid Power: Contested Hydro-Modernities in Twentieth-Century Spain, 2015). His work 
has directly inspired many, including Andy Merrifield (The Urbanization of Injustice, 1997; 
Magical Marxism: Subversive Politics and the Imagination, 2011), Susan Fainstein (Urban 
Political Movements: The Search for Power by Minority Groups in American Cities,1974; 
The Just City, 2010), Doreen Massey (Spatial Division of Labor, 1984; Space, Place, and 
Gender, 1994), and Edward Soja. A discussion of each of these authors’ contributions is 
impossible for this thesis, but no overview of the literature of social justice and geography 
would be complete without their mention. Edward Soja has been especially active in this 
field and recently wrote the invaluable Seeking Spatial Justice. 
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Seeking Spatial Justice regularly refers to both The Right to the City and Social 
Justice and the City. Soja wrote, 
Distributional inequalities arise with regard to all basic needs of urban life, ranging 
from such vital public services as education, mass transit, police and crime 
prevention, to more privatized provisioning of adequate food, housing, and 
employment. The end result is an often self-perpetuating interweaving of spatial 
injustices that, at least after passing a certain level of tolerance, can be seen as a 
fundamental violation of urban-based civil rights and legal or constitutional 
guarantees of equality and justice (Soja, 2010, p. 47). 
 
He was essentially describing what Harvey termed territorial injustice. Soja went on 
to explain that this uneven distribution can only be addressed if it is recognized as socially 
constructed and “therefore open to being changed through concerted social action” (Soja, 
2010, p. 48). Soja, like Harvey, argues that the campaign for a just city must begin with 
scholars, students, activists, grassroots organizations, and labor unions. 
Some, such as the urban planner Susan Fainstein, believe that Harvey’s and Soja’s 
reliance on revolutionary social movements makes success too improbable. Fainstein is one 
of the founders of the “Just City Movement,” which argues that public policy and 
development must incorporate democracy, diversity, and equity as their ultimate goals. David 
Harvey wrote that the idea of the Just City 
delimits its scope to acting within the existing capitalist regime of rights and 
freedoms and is thus constrained to mitigating the worst outcomes at the margins of 
an unjust system....Fainstein’s emphasis on the discursive and inspirational role of the 
Just City avoids the necessity for outright conflict and struggle. (Harvey & Potter, 
2009, p. 46) 
 
Fainstein responded to these criticisms by writing:  
my analysis is limited to what appears feasible within the present context of capitalist 
urbanization in wealthy, formally democratic, Western countries. As such it is 
susceptible to criticism for being too weak to deal with the injustices inherent in 
capitalism. (Fainstein, 2010, p. 5) 
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Soja appeared to be a bit more sympathetic to the Just City, calling it “a parallel 
discourse to spatial justice and the right to the city.” He, somewhat dismissively, wrote,  
this discourse is preeminently normative, reflecting the strong utopian tradition 
among planning theorists. . . the intrinsic appeal of its underspatialized concept of 
justice has attracted many geographers and others who prefer not to emphasize a 
more forceful form of spatial explanation. As such, it has captured increasing 
attention in contemporary theoretical and practical debates on spatial justice and the 
right to the city. (Soja, 2010, p. 29) 
 
The above conflict over how to make effective action feasible is perhaps the most 
difficult challenge for urban justice theorists, and it divides them into two theoretical 
positions: “(1) It is impossible to work within [global capitalism] and achieve a modicum of 
justice. (2) The pressure for nonreformist reforms can lead to incremental changes in the 
system that place it on a path toward justice” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 170). David Harvey is a 
believer in the first position, while Susan Fainstein believes in the second. Although one 
cannot believe in both viewpoints as equally correct, they are both valuable and should be 
viewed as complementary; the efforts of one group do not undo the efforts of the other; they 
strengthen each other’s demands for reform. Interestingly, there are two Los Angeles 
community groups – the Right to the City Alliance and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New 
Economy – that Fainstein and Soja both cite in their 2010 books as good examples of 
effective reformers, and both authors believe that their own views are shared by these 
groups.4 Whether these groups believe in the first paradigm or the second is on some level 
irrelevant; how effectively they move cities closer to justice is what truly matters. 
                                                          
4 For Fainstein’s assessment see The Just City page 170, and for Soja’s see Seeking Spatial Justice page 138. 
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Before an evaluation of how effective the Kansas City-based initiative The Green 
Impact Zone was at moving its surrounding city towards justice, it is necessary to understand 
the long history of injustices in Kansas City that precipitated the formation of The Green 
Impact Zone.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A HISTORY OF INEQUALITY IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 
 Geographers understand that every place on earth is unique. From a physical 
perspective, this statement is undeniable; each point in space has a unique location, different 
from that of every other point in space. It is often overlooked that from a cultural perspective, 
every place, however large or small, also has a unique character that distinguishes it from 
every other place. Understanding what makes a given place unique is not only a job for 
geographers; it is also a requirement for effective leaders of place-based programs such as the 
Green Impact Zone. In order to evaluate the Green Impact Zone model, we must attempt to 
understand the historical and present-day geography that makes these 150 square blocks 
unique.  
Although all places are unique, Tobler’s first law of geography teaches us that 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” 
(Tobler, 1970, p. 236). This section is not limited to a history of the small area that would 
one day be labeled as the Green Impact Zone. Instead, it focuses on the interconnectedness of 
this small section of Kansas City, Missouri, with the city as a whole. 
Special attention is paid to the processes that led to extreme racial segregation and 
disinvestment that have been common throughout the history of Kansas City; those processes 
directly led to the creation of The Green Impact Zone of Missouri. Despite a rich and unique 
urban history, Kansas City is disappointingly underrepresented in geographical studies. This 
section, therefore, draws heavily from the works of the historian Sherry Lamb Schirmer and 
the sociologist Kevin Fox Gotham, two researchers who are responsible for the two major 
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works on the social and geographical history of Kansas City. Any modern investigation on 
the racial geography of Kansas City must start with them. 
Kansas City’s Early Development Prior to the Parks and Boulevard System 
 Kansas City sits at the confluence of the Kansas and Missouri rivers. This location 
also placed Kansas City at the origin of the Santa Fe, California, and Oregon trails; the area 
became known as the last major trading and supply stop before travelers headed west in the 
early 1800s. According to Tom Sims, Committee Chair of the Native Sons and Daughters of 
Greater Kansas City: 
Gabriel Prudhomme, a French-Canadian fur trapper and trader, patented 271 acres of 
land on the south bank of the Missouri River in Jackson County, Missouri for $340. It 
originally had been part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803…The Prudhomme land 
would ultimately be auctioned off in 1838 as part of his estate and would be 
purchased by a group of men led by William Sublett for $4220. The intended use of 
the land and surroundings was for a business settlement and warehouses. There were 
14 members in this group, the Kansas Town Company. The initial order of business 
was to name the site the “Town of Kansas” after the local tribe of Indians and its 
proximity to the Kansas River. By early 1839, the site was surveyed, platted, and the 
first parcel of land was offered for sale. (Sims, n.d., para. 3) 
 
 In 1867, the consortium of Charles E. Kearney, Robert T. Van Horn, and Kersey 
Coates convinced the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad to build a cutoff at Cameron, 
Missouri that would extend to Kansas City and cross the Missouri River there, beating the 
competing offer from nearby Leavenworth, Kansas. The tracks spanned the river on the 
Hannibal Bridge, which opened in July 1869 and solidified Kansas City’s position as the 
preeminent commercial and industrial center of the region by connecting the booming City of 
Chicago with Texas. The value of the Hannibal Bridge to Kansas City’s early development 
was immense; the population of KC grew from a paltry 4,418 in 1860, to 32,260 in 1870, 
55,785 in 1880, and an impressive 132,716 in 1890 (United States Census Bureau, 2016). 
38 
 
The population of Kansas City would continue to swell well into the middle of the twentieth 
century. It is difficult to compare the decennial censuses of Kansas City’s population because 
the city has repeatedly expanded its area through annexations and in recent years has even 
divested itself of some small parcels (see Figure 2) (“Annexations History,” 2013). The city’s 
relative importance in the nation’s urban hierarchy peaked in 1930, when it ranked 19th in 
population among all U.S. cities; its population was 399,746 in an area of 58.6 square miles 
(compared to more than 318 square miles today) (United States Census Bureau, 1998). 
Because the city expanded by an average of 200 new residents per day during the 
1880s, housing and real estate in Kansas City was in great demand. Social historian Sherry 
Lamb Schirmer described an 1880s Kansas City plagued by speculators, where “properties 
sometimes changed hands two to three times in a day,” and houses and apartment blocks 
were built by “building contractors, carpenters, and men with more ambition than 
construction skills” (Schirmer, 2002, p. 13). 
 Another plague on housing in Kansas City was the proliferation of slums and 
shantytowns. Clusters of these improvised houses were found in many parts of the city, and 
troubled homeowners because of their tendency to be situated in those open plots nearest 
middle and upper-class neighborhoods. Many of the shantytown dwellers worked in the 
homes of the upper class, and proximity to their place of employment was desirable. As 
Sherry Lamb Schirmer discussed at length, wealthy homeowners believed that living so close 
to the lowest-class inhabitants of Kansas City put their social status in jeopardy. Schirmer 
documented that through the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the elite of   
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Figure 2. Kansas City, Missouri Annexation History 1853-2013. Source: Annexations 
History, Opendata KC, 2013. 
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Kansas City occupied a given neighborhood only briefly before feeling the need to flee to a 
new site offering relief from infringement. This process was unpleasant, and it became clear 
that many would pay top dollar for a noble home in a neighborhood that held out the promise 
of maintaining its high character for generations.  
 In response to this growing desire for stable, high-end real estate, two subdivisions 
were platted in 1886 on what was then beyond the eastern edge of Kansas City. Two adjacent 
neighborhoods, Hyde Park and Kenwood, located originally between Kansas City and the 
town of Westport, pioneered two techniques that would become common practice for Kansas 
City developers looking to protect their subdivisions from the blighting effects of the urban 
poor. The first innovation was the inclusion of “deed restrictions that required high standards 
of quality in home construction and placement” (Schirmer, 2002, p. 15). By including 
provisions that dictated the type of home that could be constructed within the subdivision, 
deeds prevented small, low-quality homes from being built among the larger, finer homes of 
the subdivisions. 
The second innovation came not from a developer but from George Kessler, a young 
landscape architect who had apprenticed briefly with noted American landscape architect 
Fredrick Law Olmstead. Olmstead, popularly considered the father of American landscape 
architecture, is most famously remembered as the man who designed Central Park in New 
York City. George Kessler, who had recently moved to Kansas City to open an office, was 
hired in 1887 to provide landscape character to the upcoming Hyde Park and Kenwood 
neighborhoods. The land slated for construction of these neighborhoods lay adjacent to a 
small hollow entangled with vegetation, and this fact troubled developers. As noted 
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previously, similar valleys and ravines throughout the city became home to hundreds of 
informal shacks. With this in mind, Kessler, “transformed [the hollow] into the median of a 
rambling roadway,” thus preserving the beauty of the ravine while removing the threat of 
shanty town encroachment (Schirmer, 2002, p. 15). Today, that roadway is Gillham Road, a 
major north/south thoroughfare in central Kansas City. The southernmost stretch of Gillham 
Road, where it runs adjacent to what were previously known as the Hyde Park and Kenwood 
neighborhoods and is now known as the Hyde Park neighborhood, is bordered on either side 
by the spacious Gillham Park. The immediate successes of Hyde Park and Kenwood inspired 
the city to experiment with these urban-development concepts on a much grander scale and 
to later annex the area in 1897.  
On the strength of Gillham Park’s elegant solution to the problem of blight, George 
Kessler was asked to design a citywide system of parks and boulevards. The Board of Park 
and Boulevard Commissioners believed that the lack of access to parks and natural beauty 
was detrimental, to resident’s moral and physical health, and they hired Kessler to transform 
Kansas City into a “City Beautiful.” Kessler’s final plan was completed in 1893, extensively 
carried out by 1915, and featured a network of graceful boulevards that connected parks, both 
new and old. The lots fronting these ambling boulevards promised to attract the most 
discerning of home buyers, and Kessler imagined that his plan would give “a permanent 
residence character to certain sections of the city, and will determine and fix for a long time 
to come, if not permanently, the best and most valuable residence property” (Schirmer, 2002, 
p. 16). He further envisioned that middle-class neighborhoods would form a buffer around 
the wealthy boulevard properties, while unwanted shops, businesses, and the poor of Kansas 
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City would locate in more distant parts of the city. In essence, Kessler planned land uses in 
the absence of zoning laws (which are first implemented in New York City in 1916). 
Kessler did not simply hope that slums would stay far away from his boulevards. The 
creation of many of the parks had the effect of evicting lower-income, often African-
American, families. The construction of The Paseo, which sits in the center of what would 
become The Green Impact Zone, required the eviction and bulldozing of hundreds of modest 
houses occupied by African Americans. The site for another major civic project, the 
construction of Kansas City’s Union Station, was just a few blocks south of downtown and 
conveniently displaced a large settlement of black and white squatters (Schirmer, 2002). 
These actions are emblematic of what would prove to be an ongoing struggle over control of 
the character of residential spaces in Kansas City.  
The Great Migration, J.C. Nichols, and Race Restrictive Covenants 
Prior to 1900, Kansas City was overwhelmingly integrated. In 1880, blacks could be 
found in all eight wards, each of them containing about 10% to 20% of the total black 
population (Gotham, 2002). Despite the existence of a few black enclaves, mostly on the 
north and northeast side of the city, there is no evidence to support a claim that these 
enclaves existed because of discrimination (Gotham, 2002; Schirmer, 2002). 
Things would begin to change fairly quickly after the turn of the century. Kansas City 
was a major destination for Southern blacks moving north during the Great Migration, and a 
burgeoning black population found it increasingly difficult to integrate.5 According to the 
                                                          
5 The Great Migration is the term used to describe the movement of millions of Americans from the American 
South to the American North from 1910 to 1970. This movement began in response to demand for cheap labor 
needed in factories in cities across the increasingly industrialized north. As a result of The Great Migration, the 
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U.S. Census Bureau, the city’s Black population increased from 17,567 in 1900 to 23,566 in 
1910 (34.1% increase), to 30,719 in 1920 (30.4%) and 38,574 by 1930 (25%). The isolation 
index6 shows that as both black and white populations grew throughout the first three 
decades of the 20th century, they grew increasingly isolated from one another. Isolation 
indices within Kansas City wards grew from 13.2% in 1900, to 21.7% in 1910, increasing to 
23.7% in 1920 and 31.6% in 1930 (Massey & Denton, 1993). In one neighborhood on the 
northeast side, Lincoln-Coles (now known as the Vine Street Economic Development 
District), the black population tripled from 1900 to 1920, transforming an area that was once 
25% black to 75% black. Lincoln-Coles emerged from the Great Migration as Kansas City’s 
first segregated black ghetto (Schirmer, 2002).7 
Two widely cited housing analyses, Report on Housing (Johnson, Stillman, & 
Stutsman, 1912) and Social Prospectus of Kansas City (1913) were produced by the Kansas 
City’s Board of Public Welfare, the first such Board in the nation. These publications were 
                                                          
proportion of blacks living in the South dropped from 90% in 1910 to 53% in 1970 (Tolnay, Adelman, & 
Crowder, 2002). 
 
6 An isolation index is a measure of exposure, which is defined by Massey and Denton as “the degree of 
potential contact, or possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members” (Massey & 
Denton, 1993, p. 287). For more information and to learn how to calculate isolation, see Massey and Denton, 
American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 1993. 
 
7 According to Harold Rose, author of The Black Ghetto: A Spatial Behavioral Perspective (1971), a black 
ghetto is a social area primarily made up of persons of a single race and possessing similar subcultural 
characteristics. From a practical standpoint, he defines a black ghetto as any census tract in which the 
population equals or exceeds 50% black. Ghetto core neighborhoods are represented by census tracts whose 
population is 75% or more black, with ghetto fringe neighborhoods having 50 to 74% of their population 
identified as black. Zones contiguous to the ghetto core and fringe, if they contain a black population that 
constitutes 30% or more of the total population within their domain, are thought to represent neighborhoods in 
transition. Thus the ghetto is essentially made up of neighborhoods in which blacks constitute a clear majority 
and have generally assumed dominance over local social institutions; neighborhoods in which dominance is 
incipient and change continues at a rather rapid pace; and neighborhoods in which blacks do not yet constitute 
the dominant population, but are found in large enough numbers to hasten the future outmigration of white 
population. 
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nothing more than pseudo-scientific racism. They blamed the conditions of the ghettos 
entirely on their black residents, calling them “steeped in crime, with lost virtue, and without 
purpose and without hope” (“Social Prospectus of Kansas City, Missouri,” 1913, p. 93). By 
publishing these reports, the city was reinforcing racist stereotypes and giving whites 
spurious reasons to justify their segregation.  
There is a simultaneous ascribing of social values to race and race to social values 
evident in the above reports. This process is described in detail in Kevin Fox Gotham’s Race, 
Real Estate, and Uneven Development. This concept is given the name racialization and is 
described by Gotham as: 
The way in which racial categories sort people, society distributes resources along 
racial lines, and state policy shapes and is shaped by the racial contours of society. 
Central to the concept of racialization is the idea that race has an emergent and 
variable quality rather than a fixed or immutable group characteristic. Racial groups 
are socially and politically constructed and exist as the outcome of diverse historical 
practices (e.g., programmatic organization of social policy, modes of political 
participation, etc.) that are continually subject to challenge over definition and 
meaning. (Gotham, 2002, p. 11) 
 
 Associating skin color with certain behaviors was undoubtedly not new to Kansas 
City, but the degree to which these stereotypes had become institutionalized was novel. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the housing analyses, white Kansas Citians not only identified 
black Kansas Citians with certain undesirable qualities, but declared sections of their city as 
black and therefore as problematic. This linking of social conditions, race, and space, shows 
how space itself can become racialized. Linking place, race, and behavior together allowed 
whites to blame the wretched conditions in parts of the city on the simple fact of someone 
being black (Gotham, 2002, pp. 36-37). 
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Whites in Kansas City were desperately trying to keep blacks out of their 
neighborhoods or relocate to somewhere else that could. The success of the Hyde Park and 
Kenwood neighborhoods inspired a young real estate developer by the name of J.C. Nichols 
to attempt to build the most prestigious subdivision in Kansas City. As a developer, Nichols 
had had relative success developing on the Kansas side of Kansas City and had begun buying 
land on what was then the southern edge of Kansas City, Missouri. Before his first Missouri 
development had begun in 1910, he already owned over 1,000 acres of land in the large area 
annexed to Kansas City in 1909 (Worley, 1990). 
Nichols admired the work that Kessler had done as a planner for the Hyde Park and 
Kenwood neighborhoods decades earlier, and so when Nichols began the work of developing 
his own land, he hired George Kessler to plan his first subdivision, Bismark Place (near 51st 
and Main streets), which would later become part of the Country Club District south of Brush 
Creek (Gilligan, 2014). Kessler’s plan once again “protected” (i.e., segregated) the perimeter 
of the developments by constructing a buffer of green spaces. To preserve the racial makeup 
of the homeowners in his neighborhoods, J.C. Nichols carried the racial deed restrictions 
inherited when he took over Bismark Place from its original developer (Morton, 2016). 
Unlike the deed restrictions used in Hyde Park, however, these stated that “none of the lots 
hereby restricted may be conveyed to, used, owned, nor occupied by Negroes as owners or 
tenants” (Gotham, 2002, p. 625). All the common restrictions such as size and cost of homes 
still applied, but now homeowners had an additional guarantee that their home would retain 
its high value. 
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Race-restrictive covenants, as these restrictions are known, made it possible to 
reorganize the city into segregated neighborhoods and keep it that way. For those in the real 
estate industry, segregated neighborhoods were seen as a requirement for stable property 
values and real estate profit (Gotham, 2002). For aspiring residents, these homes were 
imagined to be, as J.C. Nichols himself advertised, in the “most protected and highest class 
region in or near Kansas City” (Gotham, 2002, p. 42). So successful were racially restrictive 
covenants that by 1920 the widely held view was that “it was unethical for real estate firms 
and land developers to not restrict” (Gotham, 2002, p. 37). 
The legality of race-restrictive covenants was upheld in the courts until 1948 when 
Shelly v. Kraemer ruled them unenforceable. This U.S. Supreme Court decision did not have 
the dramatic effect that many expected. For example, from 1948 through 1960, there were 
actually more race-restrictive covenants recorded in the Kansas City area than from 1900 to 
1948 (Gotham, 2002, p. 40). 
 Not everyone, however, was able to move to a new home. Some of those who stayed 
in contested neighborhoods used anonymous death threats and arson to remove black 
residents from predominantly white neighborhoods (Schirmer, 2002). Even areas where 
whites and blacks had coexisted peacefully for nearly a decade could become the site of 
racially motivated bombings, as was the case in 1910. The eastern side of the Vine Street 
corridor, in the area of Montgall Avenue and 25th Street, where a heterogeneous mix of 
white, black, skilled blue-collar, and white-collar workers lived, experienced six dynamite 
explosions in two years (Schirmer, 2002). It appears that no one was killed as a result of the 
bombings, and no arrest was made for two years. When the police finally did arrest someone, 
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it was “a black man who, police claimed, had aimed to reduce property values in the area on 
behalf of prospective black buyers” (Schirmer, 2002, p. 74). The bombs did significant 
damage to the homes, and the explosions and arrest and sentencing of a black man scarred 
the psyches of black residents in the neighborhood.  
Urban Renewal and Public Housing 
Many northern cities experienced a major increase in the population of blacks during 
the years from 1915 to 1930. This time, part of the years known as the “Great Migration,” 
was the basis for the formation of exclusionary real estate ideologies that associated the 
presence of blacks with declining property values and neighborhood instability (Gotham, 
2002, p. 34). The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) championed 
segregative housing practices through its textbooks, pamphlets, and periodicals, even 
amending its code of ethics to read “a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing 
into a neighborhood… members of any race or nationality… whose presence will clearly be 
detrimental to property values in that neighborhood” (Gotham, 2002, p. 35). The Housing 
Act of 1934, an important component of New Deal legislation, was enacted to salvage the 
home-building and finance industries. This act created the Federal Housing Administration, 
lowered home down-payments from 30% to less than 10%, established minimum standards 
for construction, and eliminated lending institutions’ risk in mortgage financing by providing 
mortgage insurance. When combined with a heavy dose of bigoted anti-black rhetoric 
coming from the FHA and local real estate industries, the Housing Act of 1934 was 
responsible for a large number of residents leaving the city for houses in the suburbs. 
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In Kansas City, these policies contributed to the decline of the central business 
district. In the 10-year period after 1935, the assessed value of the central business district 
sank 6% while the city as a whole lost only 0.5% in assessed value. Economic trends aside, 
the Kansas City elite were already displeased with the frustrating traffic, decreasing 
population and drab appearance of downtown residential areas (Gotham, 2002). The solution 
to these problems was complicated. No private developer had the organizational, financial or 
legal capacity to acquire enough downtown land to make large-scale renewal possible. One 
solution that was promoted by The National Association of Real Estate Boards was for the 
federal government to pass legislation to help make private renewal easier and more 
profitable. Significant lobbying on the part of the NAREB ensured that large-scale clearance 
of slum areas and the consequential reconstruction was delegated to the private sector. 
Yet another housing act was enacted by the federal government in 1937, followed by 
others in 1949 and in 1954. According to Gotham,  
The Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 represented the culmination of real estate 
industry lobbying efforts to curtail the production of public housing, create local 
redevelopment authorities with broad powers of eminent domain, and provide 
generous public subsidies for private redevelopment. (Gotham, 2001, p. 297) 
 
To execute the downtown slum-clearance project, Kansas City’s elected officials, in 
accordance with federal guidelines, created the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority 
(LCRA) in 1953. Although funding came primarily from the federal level, local authorities 
were allowed to allocate funding with great autonomy. Therefore, it was the City of Kansas 
City’s job to appoint members to the LCRA. When the staff was finalized, it was 
unsurprisingly “composed of leaders from the private sector” (Gotham, 2001, p. 298). From 
the creation of the LCRA to the end of the 1960s, $80 million went to financing 
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redevelopment and renewal, and two-thirds of that money came from the federal government 
(Gotham 2002, p. 78). 
Eighteen urban renewal projects took place in Kansas City, Missouri, between 1953 
and 1969, totaling 5,130.3 acres of land and demolishing 4,415 homes, 1,783 of which were 
owned by blacks (Gotham, 2002). Meanwhile, Kansas City was lauded by local newspapers, 
given national awards, and visited by mayors, planners, and officials from over one dozen 
major municipalities throughout the country.  
Not everyone was as pleased with the results of the downtown renewal. The first four 
projects undertaken (Northside, Attucks, South Humboldt, and Eastside) removed a reported 
1,899 homes to make room for parking lots, freeway loops, and “to clear predominantly 
black neighborhoods adjacent to the downtown” (Gotham, 2002, p. 80). Displaced Kansas 
Citians, especially blacks who were still banned from purchasing many homes, relied on the 
Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri (HAKC) to place them in public housing, which 
was formally segregated by race until 1964. All of the public housing developments built by 
HAKC in the 1950s and 1960s were built within six miles of each other, with Independence 
Avenue functioning as the color line: all white units were found north of Independence 
Avenue, black units south of Independence and east of Troost Avenue (Gotham, 2001). 
Even those that weren’t forced to relocate were often negatively affected. Many 
businesses located in disrupted neighborhoods were forced to close down because they 
lacked the clientele that they depended on. Families that remained in neighborhoods near 
downtown urban renewal were forced to watch as homes and businesses alike were destroyed 
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and stable neighborhoods were broken. Few residents in this area ever saw their 
neighborhoods recover (Gotham, 2002). 
Ultimately, the same string of “slum removal” efforts that received awards from Look 
Magazine and the American Institute of Architects, and garnered Kansas City Star headlines 
such as “A Dream City without Slums,” (1952) and “City Faces Great Era” (1958) received 
another, more damning recognition, in 1973 (Gotham, 2002). After multiple investigations, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development publicly declared the LCRA guilty of 
discriminatory relocation activities. LCRA had violated the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts 
and “contributed to the development and perpetuation of racial housing patterns [and] has 
and will concentrate large segments of the population by racial…characteristics” (Gotham, 
2002, p. 83). 
Compared to race-restrictive covenants and earlier forms of spatial segregation, urban 
renewal was far more pernicious. Whereas covenants disallowed blacks from owning homes 
in certain neighborhoods, renewal destroyed the neighborhoods they inhabited. Although two 
of the original goals of urban renewal were to eliminate substandard housing and reduce 
segregation, the legacy of urban renewal throughout this nation is more akin to “slum-
shifting” or even “negro removal” (Gotham, 2002, p. 88). In Kansas City, this period forcibly 
drew most of the tacit lines upon which the city is still divided racially today.  
School Segregation and the Troost Wall 
In 1955, when Brown v. Topeka Board of Education ruled segregated schools 
unconstitutional, Kansas City had been operating such schools for nearly a century. In order 
to comply with the expectations set in place by Brown v. Board, the Kansas City Missouri 
51 
 
School District (KCMSD) drew school attendance zones that directed all students from a 
given neighborhood to attend a specific school. These neighborhood attendance zones may 
have arguably been in compliance with the letter of the law, but because they were drawn on 
very explicit racial lines and perpetuated a school system that was almost entirely segregated, 
they were certainly not in compliance with the spirit of the law. The north/south boundaries 
used by KCMSD shifted occasionally throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, but only one 
east/west boundary was ever used: Troost Avenue. 
In 1954, the year before Brown v. Board, Kansas City schools were fully segregated, 
and therefore the only high school with any black students was the all-black high school, 
Lincoln, at Woodland Avenue and 21st Street. By 1957, every high school in Kansas City 
had seen at least one black student enroll, but only at Lincoln and Central, at 3221 Indiana 
Avenue, was more than 2.6% of the student body made up by black students. Lincoln, which 
is about a half-mile east of Troost, had shown no signs of integration by 1975. All the other 
high schools, which were at one time explicitly all-white schools, accepted increasing 
numbers of African-American students. Undeniably, the schools east of Troost experienced a 
much higher rate of enrollment by black students than schools situated west of Troost. In 
1964, Paseo High School, at 4747 Flora Avenue, was 50.2% black, which is nearly a perfect 
split between black and non-black students. No other school that year, however, could claim 
any similar level of integration. The other five Kansas City high schools that year, in 
percentage of their student body identified as black, were 8.5%, .5%, 99.9%, 99.6%, and 
3.0%. By 1975, all three high schools east of Troost and the once explicitly all-black school, 
Lincoln, were more than 97.5% black. The two remaining high schools west of Troost, 
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Westport and Southwest, had student populations of 47.6% and 12%, respectively, who 
identified as black (see Figure 3) (Gotham, 2002). 
Such a dramatic shift in the demographics of schools was made possible by an 
equally dramatic shift in the racial identity of Kansas City’s southeast corridor. Racial 
turnover had been occurring incrementally in Kansas City for decades, but beginning in the 
1950s, this turnover became very rapid. Table 2 shows population change as a total as well as 
for each race in the 16-square-mile area referred to here as Kansas City Southeast of the 
Central Business District (CBD). The boundaries for this section are 12th Street to the north, 
Gregory Boulevard to the south, Troost Avenue to the west, and Blue River, Interstate 70, 
and Cleveland Avenue to the east. 
As Gotham points out, racial transition is well documented in urban geography, going 
all the way back to Robert Park and Ernst Burgess’ landmark theory on “invasion” and 
“succession.” During the 1920s, these two Chicago School geographers developed a theory 
in which a lower-status group of in-migrants “invades” the territory of a higher-status group, 
and the latter group vacates the area by relocating further from the city center, allowing the 
invading group to “succeed” it. Although these studies and many others account for more 
inevitable forms of racial transition, the rapid turnover in this area of Kansas City was not 
inevitable and cannot be accounted for by racial-ethnic transition models alone. Instead, this 
transition is best understood as a result of real estate professionals’ use of racialized 
propaganda and blockbusting. 
  
 
5
3
 
Table 1  
Kansas City, Missouri School District Enrollment by High School 1945-1975  
Note. From Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, by K. F. Gotham, p. 106. Copyright 2003 by State University of New 
York Press.
 High Schools West of Troost Avenue High Schools East of Troost Avenue 
Westport Southwest Lincoln Central Paseo Southeast 
School 
Year 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
Total 
Enrolled 
% 
Black 
1954-55 1461 0 2031 0 1100 100 1604 0 1657 0 1575 0 
1955-56 1543 2.3 2042 0.01 738 99.7 1748 11.2 1665 1.6 1752 0 
1956-57 1780 2.6 2074 0.1 743 99.8 1779 17 1709 2.4 1800 0 
1957-58 1622 2.5 2123 0 945 100 1836 28.2 1756 2.6 1900 0.1 
1958-59 1643 2.4 2141 0 954 100 1873 42.4 1710 4 1884 0.5 
1959-60 1713 2.6 1923 0 973 100 1667 70.5 1859 6.6 1896 1.3 
1960-61 1684 2.5 1772 0.1 827 100 1522 90.2 1893 9.7 1883 1.7 
1961-62 1812 3 1941 0 898 100 1945 97.2 1888 16.3 1777 2.6 
1962-63 1791 4 2035 0 1002 100 2138 99 1746 23.3 1656 5.9 
1963-64 1806 5.9 2247 0.2 1109 99.8 2272 99.1 1629 36.4 1766 8.4 
1964-65 1967 8.5 2371 0.5 1075 99.9 2518 99.6 1648 50.2 1770 3 
1965-66 1862 10.9 2469 0.7 1121 99.9 2648 99.4 1597 62.4 1781 22.2 
1966-67 1884 14 2469 0.6 1124 99.9 2427 99.1 1655 70.2 1767 25.2 
1967-68 1882 26.7 2388 0.3 1357 99.9 2353 99.9 1920 78.1 1706 33.2 
1968-69 1958 26.5 2404 0.5 1397 100 2224 99.8 1497 88 1630 42.9 
1969-70 1815 30.5 2429 0.5 1362 100 2369 99.9 1534 97.8 1403 59.3 
1970-71 1766 38 2387 0.8 1323 100 2115 99.9 1545 99.4 1463 79.6 
1971-72 1628 41.1 2406 1.6 1465 100 2416 100 1788 99.7 1647 92.2 
1972-73 1541 45.8 2265 2.8 1247 100 2128 100 1403 99.9 1894 96.5 
1973-74 1625 45.7 2280 6.6 1324 100 2295 100 1490 99.8 2291 97.9 
1974-75 1361 47.6 2017 12 1312 99.9 2204 100 1466 99.9 2114 97.7 
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Table 2 
Total and Racial Population Change in Kansas City, Missouri Southeast of the CBD 1950-
1970 
  
1950 
 
1960 
 
1970 
Total change 
1950-1970 
Total Population  
Southeast of CBD 
169,047 163,119 137,665 -31,382 
White Population 126,229 88,986 33,804 -92,425 
Percentage White 74.7% 54.4% 24.6%  
Black Population 41,348 73,788 102,741 +61,933 
Percentage Black 24.4% 45.2% 74.6%  
Note. From Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development, by K. F. Gotham, p. 95. Copyright 
2003 by State University of New York Press. 
 
 
Profit-seeking real estate agents convinced whites living east of Troost that their 
homes would become less valuable if a neighboring house were occupied by a black family. 
Whites, hoping to sell their houses before the supposed drop in value, made “panic sales” to 
real estate agents. After one house had been put up for sale, the block was referred to as 
“busted,” and it became much easier to scare the remaining white homeowners on the block 
into selling their houses to the real estate agent. White homeowners typically took whatever 
money they could get from a real estate agent, who then turned around and sold the house at 
full value or even a higher price (the difference called the “color tax”) to incoming black 
families. This process of blockbusting was a major factor in the sudden racial turnover of 
Southeast Kansas City. 
With the racial transition also came a major decrease in financial and government 
investment, resulting in a deteriorating housing stock and poverty-stricken residents. The 
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Metropolitan Planning Commission (1971) produced a study estimating that over half of the 
metropolitan area’s “inner city area” had “substandard” housing.8 Later, Kansas City’s City 
Development Department (1973 p. 34) found that 20.3% of all the families living in the 
Heart of the City North were below the poverty level, as compared to 8.8% for Kansas City, 
Missouri.9 The Development Department’s planning report also showed (Plate 10) that in 
most blocks in that area the predominant structural condition of housing was “deteriorating” 
or “dilapidated”.10 
By all accounts, these tendencies towards segregation along Troost Avenue continued 
into the 1990s. Black invasion and succession continued to be contained to the parts of the 
city east of Troost and continued southward; in 1990 the census data showed that every 
neighborhood that was at least half black was located east of Troost (Gotham, 2002). An 
examination of 2010 census data by census tract yielded similar findings: all census tracts in 
the city that are at least 50% black are located entirely or mostly east of Troost Avenue. 
While the census tract with the highest percentage of black residents with at least 10 
residents living in tract (tract 57, 93.64%) was not in the Green Impact Zone, the tract with 
the second highest percentage of black residents was in the Green Impact Zone: tract 78.02 
                                                          
8In the United States, Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are local government organizations legally 
charged with coordinating short- and long-range transportation planning for all urbanized areas in the country 
with more than 50,000 residents. MPOs exist in numerous forms but generally operate as a function of regional 
councils of government (COGs) or as a subdivision of state departments of transportation (DOTs). Although a 
few regions around the country established MPOs as early as the 1950s, it was not until the early 1970s that 
federal transportation laws demanded the creation of regional entities to carry out metropolitan transportation 
planning (Sanchez, 2006). 
9 Heart of the City North was defined as bounded by I-70 on the north, I-70 and the Blue River on the east, 
Brush Creek on the south, and Troost Avenue on the west. 
10 Deteriorating is defined as needing one major repair or a number of minor ones. Dilapidated is defined as 
requiring two or more major repairs and as a shelter is unsafe. 
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with 93.56%. See Table 3 and Figure 3 for more details about the majority black census 
tracts in Kansas City. 
The 150-square-block area that is The Green Impact Zone of Missouri is completely 
contained within Kansas City’s southeast corridor. The Green Impact Zone’s challenge was 
to address a long history of discrimination and disinvestment by utilizing a place-based 
approach to urban equity.  
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Table 3 
Kansas City, Missouri Census Tracts with at Least 50% Black Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. From 2010 Census/ACS Detailed Census Tract Data. 
Census Tract Percent Black 
37 89.68% 
38 91.47% 
52 79.53% 
53 76.54% 
54 90.25% 
55 91.76% 
56.01 88.56% 
56.02 93.55% 
57 93.64% 
58.01 91.27% 
60 91.53% 
61 92.17% 
63 85.86% 
76 90.43% 
77 93.29% 
78.02 93.56% 
79 89.54% 
80 93.35% 
81 82.73% 
87 86.89% 
88 90.51% 
89 91.12% 
90 87.26% 
95 65.66% 
96 68.00% 
97 63.82% 
102.01 54.76% 
129.03 57.65% 
129.04 53.38% 
129.06 56.67% 
130.03 65.37% 
131 55.52% 
132.03 61.38% 
132.08 73.72% 
132.1 68.27% 
154 70.62% 
160 66.90% 
161 88.61% 
162 81.47% 
164 57.29% 
165 89.07% 
166 90.63% 
169 87.33% 
171 92.04% 
172 55.91% 
174 59.64% 
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Figure 3. 2010 Census Tract Reference Map: Jackson County, Missouri. Source: Opendata 
KC, 2014. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE GREEN IMPACT ZONE OF MISSOURI 
 
The Green Impact Zone is a 150-square-block area in the urban core of Kansas City, 
Mo., that serves as a national model of place-based investment, demonstrating how a 
distressed community can be transformed through intense, focused coordination of 
programs and resources. (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2010b, para. 1) 
 
The Creation of the Green Impact Zone 
The Green Impact Zone of Missouri was created out of a combination of need and 
opportunity. Kansas City, Missouri, like much of the nation, was suffering from a slate of 
problems in 2009. Across the United States, jobs were scarce and home foreclosures were 
plentiful. Industry and financial institutions were at risk of collapse. The urban core of 
Kansas City, Missouri, had suffered decades of disinvestment, and neighborhoods were 
overrun with joblessness and the poverty, crime, and degraded housing conditions that 
followed. Urban problems are rarely if ever felt by all residents equally, and in Kansas City 
the neighborhoods east of Troost Avenue suffered the most; Table 4 compares demographic 
data for all of Kansas City to that of the urban core and for just a select part of the urban core 
known as the Green Impact Zone. 
An opportunity to address this need came with the creation of The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This $787 billion job-creation bill promised to put 
Americans to work in doing what needed to be done across the country. According to Section 
3 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009),  
“The purposes of this act include the following: (1) To preserve and create jobs and 
promote economic recovery. (2) To assist those most impacted by the recession. (3) 
To provide investments to increase economic efficiency by spurring technological 
advances in science and health. (4) To invest in transportation, environmental 
protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits.”  
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Table 4 
Demographic Data for All of Kansas City, the Kansas City Urban Core, and the Green 
Impact Zone 
 
 Kansas City Urban Core Green Impact Zone 
Total Population 441,545 187,304 8,374 
Black, Non-Hispanic Population 31.01% 53.55% 89.28% 
Hispanic Population 6.96% 11.30% 2.03% 
White, Non-Hispanic Population 57.63% 30.25% 6.50% 
Other Race or Multiracial 
Population 
4.43% 4.91% 2.20% 
Single Parent Households 11.91% 16.04% 24.64% 
ersons in Rental Units 36.50% 48.61% 47.94% 
Population in Poverty 14.31% 24.89% 30.66% 
Median Household Income $40,149 $26,762 $22,387 
Per Capita Income $20,777 $15,351 $12,239 
Households with < $10K 11.51% 19.73% 26.27% 
Households with $10-20K 13.14% 18.58% 21.82% 
Households with $20-30K 15.04% 18.01% 16.04% 
Households with $30-40K 13.97% 10.54% 9.52% 
Households with > $60K 27.06% 14.66% 10.40% 
Note. From Green Impact Zone of Missouri. (2010a, February). Preliminary baseline data 
report.  
 
 
Specifically, the act would stimulate the economy by creating jobs while investing in “shovel 
ready projects” in the places that were most affected by the recession. Among the countless 
local governments, community groups, and companies that sought recovery money was the 
Green Impact Zone of Missouri. 
Congressman Emmanuel Cleaver II of Missouri’s Fifth District is credited as having 
the initial vision of the Green Impact Zone of Missouri as early as February of 2009. Cleaver 
cautioned that too often, federal dollars fail to live up to their potential because they get 
stretched in too many directions. He described the drawback of sharing resources over a large 
area: “we would have a speck here and a speck there, and afterwards, the taxpayers would 
question what happened to their money” (Bozorg, 2010, p. 43). The alternative, which he 
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advocated for, was to target as many of the federal stimulus dollars as possible towards “one 
of the toughest parts of the city. The Kansas City Star labeled one of the tracts [actually ZIP 
code 64130], the murder factory” (Bozorg, 2010, p. 43).11 
The area, bounded by Troost Avenue to the west, Prospect and Swope avenues on the 
east, 39th Street to the north, and 51st Street to the south, covers parts of five neighborhoods: 
Historic Manheim Park, 49-63/Troostwood, Ivanhoe, Blue Hills, and Town Fork Creek. 
Although it was clear that the area that Cleaver had in mind faced major challenges, he 
argued for its significant potential as well. Both of these qualities are described in Table 5. 
Other factors that may have contributed to these specific boundaries include: 
likelihood of support from council representatives for the area, Cleaver’s familiarity with 
redevelopment of the area from his history of engagement with the Brush Creek Corridor that 
cuts through the Green Impact Zone, and the pre-existing plans for a Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) system along Troost Avenue and new pedestrian bridge over Brush Creek on Troost 
Avenue (Bozorg, 2010).  
                                                          
11 For the award winning articles that coined the term “murder factory,” see the three-part series from Tony 
Rizzo published in the Kansas City Star: “Murder Factory, Part 1: 64130, The ZIP Code of Notoriety in 
Missouri,” Kansas City Star, January 24. 2009, A1; “Murder Factory, Part 2: 64130, Decades of blight leave 
ZIP code 64130 reeling in violence,” Kansas City Star January 26, 2009, A4; “Murder Factory, Part 3: KC 
needs to fight back and “close” the factory,” Kansas City Star January 28, 2009, B7. Parts 2 and 3 are available 
from the Kansas City Star website for a fee. 
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Table 5 
Challenges and Potential of the Site Selected for the Green Impact Zone 
Challenges Potential 
37.3% poverty rate Five strong neighborhood associations. 
55% of population has high 
school education or less. 
Five Community Development Corporations (CDCs)12 
41% of the housing stock built 
before 1940 
In the area between the Zone and the Country Club 
Plaza homes range in value between $500,000 - $1 
million dollars13 
$22,712 median income Active civic leaders and organizations 
53% renters  
One grocery store; limited 
access to fresh fruits and 
vegetables 
 
More than 1,000 vacant lots and 
many abandoned homes and 
commercial buildings 
 
Note: From Green Impact Zone of Missouri. (2013b, p. 4) 
 
 
 
Cleaver also had an innovative idea that would simultaneously provide invaluable 
support and structure to the Green Impact Zone, while granting its residents access to 
invaluable expertise and to a wide array of partnerships. His idea was to place oversight of 
the Green Impact Zone of Missouri within Kansas City’s highly respected regional planning 
organization, the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC). Although some believed that it 
                                                          
12 A community development corporation is a non-profit organization that is locally based and works to 
improve the quality of life in poor communities. The CDC may function like a private developer, but it is 
governed by the community. 
13 The Country Club Plaza, built in 1922, is often considered to be the earliest automobile oriented regional 
shopping center and thus the prototype for the postwar American shopping mall 
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was risky to relinquish his oversight to another body, his decision proved to be a defining 
moment for the Green Impact Zone.  
 Positioning the Green Impact Zone within MARC: 
provided the proper transparent, reputable, apolitical support and structure needed to 
springboard the initiative. MARC also provided administrative support such as 
payroll, grant administration and human resources. MARC, as the Zone’s oversight 
body, also provides connections to a cadre of partners who have been invaluable in 
constructing a program focused on community transformation. (Green Impact Zone, 
2013b, p. 2) 
 
 For MARC, supporting the Green Impact Zone was a responsibility and an 
opportunity. The missions of the Green Impact Zone and MARC are complementary, but the 
strengths of MARC and the strengths of the Green Impact Zone were different. MARC 
excels at administrative tasks and federal grant writing, while the Green Impact Zone’s 
grassroots structure allowed greater levels of outreach and engagement. Even though the 
efforts of the Green Impact Zone were to be focused on a very small part of the metropolitan 
area MARC oversees, it must have been clear to MARC that any initiative that benefits one 
part of its region benefits the whole region. Furthermore, it is likely that MARC had the 
foresight to see that a combined initiative was more likely to receive federal funding than 
either initiative would individually. Ultimately, federal dollars awarded to the joint efforts of 
MARC and the Green Impact Zone also were used in projects outside of the Green Impact 
Zone. 
 The role of the city of Kansas City, Missouri, cannot be overlooked. City Hall funded 
the project at $1.5 million in the first year, which would “provide for a core staff and office 
space and support a number of neighborhood programs in the zone” (Green Impact Zone, 
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2009, p. 1). The City’s commitment to the Green Impact Zone program signaled a strong 
network of partners and helped propel the initiative to a very promising beginning. 
 After MARC had agreed to take on the Green Impact Zone, the latter’s organization 
quickly began to take shape. A string of meetings with community leaders, local government 
personnel, and select business owners took place between March and September of 2009. 
The task of these meetings was to ensure that these partners had a voice in the direction of 
the initiative during this early stage. Whereas MARC is an organization with a regional focus 
that depends on rotating city and county officials as well as a permanent staff, the Green 
Impact Zone was created with a highly participatory philosophy. Therefore, engaging 
residents of the Zone at the earliest possible stage was essential to the success of this 
initiative. They met to discuss the “vision and mission statements, define policies and 
determine actions to address priority activities” (Green Impact Zone, 2009, p. 1). The Green 
Impact Zone was building relationships – relationships that are critical to the success of a 
grassroots organization – and showing everyone that the Zone’s partners would be very 
supportive of this initiative. 
 In these early stages, MARC relied heavily upon the Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, 
Brush Creek Community Partners, and Blue Hills Community Services. These three bodies – 
a neighborhood association, a community advocacy group, and , a community development 
corporation (CDC), respectively – had paid staff members and the resources to quickly bring 
together and organize the rest of the community (Bozorg, 2010). This group of three 
neighborhood organizations grew into the 10 neighborhood partners and nine other partners 
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(see Table 6) that would remain as the major partners until the end of the Green Impact Zone 
in 2014. 
Table 6 
Green Impact Zone Partners 
Neighborhood Partners Other Partners 
 49/63 Neighborhood Association 
 Blue Hills Community Services 
 Blue Hills Neighborhood Association 
 Brush Creek Community Partners 
 Historic Manheim Park Council 
 Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council 
 Neighborhood Housing Services 
 Swope Community Builders 
 Town Fork Creek Neighborhood 
Association 
 Troostwood Neighborhood Association 
 
 City of Kansas City, Missouri 
 Full Employment Council 
 Kansas City Area Transportation 
Authority 
 Kansas City Metropolitan Crime 
Commission 
 Kansas City Police Department 
 Kansas City Power and Light Company 
 Metropolitan Energy Center 
 Missouri Gas Energy 
 University of Missouri, Kansas City 
Note. From Spatializing Social Equity through Place-based Policies, by L. Bozorg, 2010 p. 
50. Copyright 2010 by Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
 
 
 
Through the collaboration of MARC, Emmanuel Cleaver, and the aforementioned 
partners, the identity of the Green Impact Zone started to become clear.  
The Green Impact Zone Model 
The next task was to turn these initial meetings into an operational place-based 
initiative worthy of receiving competitive American Recovery and Reinvestment Act dollars. 
The cadre of public officials and neighborhood partners formed the backbone of the Green 
Impact Zone and worked to attract additional talent and resources in the following months.  
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Individuals associated with the Green Impact Zone at this time were divided into 
eight committees and were tasked with developing goals and strategies for obtaining specific 
types of Recovery Act grants. These committees were the following: 
 Coordinating Council 
 Employment and Training Committee 
 Energy Efficiency Committee 
 Housing and Weatherization Committee 
 Infrastructure Committee 
 Neighborhood Leadership Committee 
 Public Safety Committee 
 Youth Programs 
This exploratory version of the Green Impact Zone was also responsible for creating 
the official Green Impact Zone vision, guiding principles, and strategies. These core values 
reflect the highly participatory and sustainable approach that the Green Impact Zone would 
promote throughout its existence:  
Vision: The Green Impact Zone Vision is to develop a sustainable community; one 
that is environmentally, economically, and socially stronger tomorrow than it is today 
...using a comprehensive green strategy...coordinated programs and innovative 
delivery mechanisms...and intense resident engagement...to more rapidly push 
community change, build community capacity, and make the Green Impact Zone a 
place where people want to live, work, and play. 
 
Guiding Principles: The work will be inclusive, with resident participation and 
representation, community accountability and transparency; The work will be 
effective, building organizational and community capacity; The work will be 
efficient, leveraging resources, strategically using resources and fiscally accounting 
for resources; The work will complement and enhance existing neighborhood goals 
and activities; The work will cross-pollinate ideas, programs, and people; The work 
will be evidence-based, using information and data to evaluate the effectiveness of 
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activities; The work will be targeted so that each block sees significant improvements 
to lives, homes, and community assets. 
 
Strategies: The zone, in year one, will engage the community in a conversation 
about what the elements should be in such a sustainability strategy. This discussion 
will be based on the collection of a wealth of information about the community aided 
by such institutions as the University of Missouri at Kansas City and the University 
of Kansas. However, the most critical element of this process is the engagement of 
the community in a discussion of the kind of neighborhood residents want and what 
needs to be done to create and sustain that neighborhood. (Bozorg, 2010, p. 51) 
 
 A short time after these summer visioning sessions, a valuable connection with 
PolicyLink was forged. PolicyLink is a national research and advocacy institute that focuses 
on equitable development. Initially, PolicyLink provided MARC with a $15,000 grant which 
financed capacity building for each of the individual neighborhood associations. Subsequent 
involvement from PolicyLink focused on providing the Green Impact Zone guidance and 
identifying best practices from around the country (Bozorg, 2010). 
 The final step before successfully getting the Green Impact Zone off the ground was 
the hiring of a full-time staff. Because of the types of programs that Cleaver, MARC, and the 
existing partners had established, the need for full-time staff members was apparent. 
According to a 2013 Green Impact Zone white paper:  
A full-time staff with a wide experience base is essential for a place-based initiative 
to have the depth and acceptance in the community required for success. While 
residents helped craft the vision for the zone and are building their capacity to take 
on leadership roles, they can’t do it all by themselves as volunteers. A full-time staff 
armed with the experience, education and passion to transform communities is 
integral in tracking, managing and moving neighborhood initiatives forward. Staff 
has the ability to manage cross-sector partnerships, mitigate community challenges 
and provide technical assistance to community partners. (Green Impact Zone, 2013b, 
p. 2) 
 
The funding for staff members officially came from Kansas City, Missouri, in the 
form of a $1.5 million contract. The City, however, received the money from the 
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discretionary fund for public works managed by Councilwoman Cindy Circo of Kansas 
City’s Fifth District. Part of this contract was the requirement that the Green Impact Zone 
staff produce a progress report every 45 days. 
The first hire was former Assistant City Manager Anita Maltbia for the role of 
Director of the Green Impact Zone of Missouri. Six more staff members were hired under the 
combined leadership of MARC and Maltbia: an assistant director, an office administrator, 
and four community ombudsmen (Bozorg, 2010). The Director and Assistant Director were 
responsible for developing techniques for achieving organizational goals, while the role of 
each community ombudsman was to work directly with a specific neighborhood and be its 
contact person. The ombudsmen were expected to become experts on their neighborhood. 
One case study illustrates the value of this position very well: on the day the first recipient of 
a home weatherization grant (a program that is discussed in greater detail later) was 
scheduled to have her home weatherized, a miscommunication between homeowner and 
contractor led to the project being delayed. The Green Impact Zone was informed that if the 
homeowner was not prepared for weatherization within 24 hours, she would not receive any 
service.  
The ombudsman assigned to the neighborhood where the homeowner lived had a 
year-long history of interacting with the neighborhood association’s block captains, 
volunteers and paid staff. The ombudsman knew the personalities and organizational 
roles of those involved, and therefore knew who to call on to get things done. The 
ombudsman was able to use his relationship with the homeowner and association staff 
person to get the situation resolved quickly.… The homeowner, zone ombudsman and 
contractor met…[and] resolved the miscommunication and in less than 24 hours the 
work was back on track (Green Impact Zone, 2013b, p. 11).  
 
 After the initial wave of hiring was complete, Congressman Cleaver announced the 
creation of the Green Impact Zone in a ribbon cutting ceremony on September 1 2009. 
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Cleaver was joined by many high ranking federal officials: White House Office of Urban 
Affairs Director Adolfo Carron, Jr., Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun 
Donovan, and Department of Transportation Deputy Secretary John Porcari were in 
attendance. In the announcement, the “zone was framed as a national model for targeted 
investments, seeking to demonstrate how 150 square blocks of the urban core might be 
transformed through sustainable reinvestment” (Green Impact Zone, 2013b, p. 4). 
 Specifically, the model to which Emanuel Cleaver was referring is known as the 
Green Impact Zone Neighborhood Revitalization Model. It was touted by the Green Impact 
Zone as a model that can be replicated in neighborhoods across the nation and as 
representing a model for a comprehensive urban-renewal strategy. 
 In practice, this model starts with “convening a core team of leaders from 
neighborhood associations and community development organizations, as well as nonprofit, 
private and civic partners” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b, para. 1). The model 
consists of three key elements: scale, people and place, and both sides of the equation 
(communities and outside organizations).  
 Scale, according the Green Impact Zone, means “work must be done on a scale large 
enough to change the market in the community, with a focus on specific projects that can act 
as catalysts for further development” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b, para. 2). As a 
key element, scale favors large, visible projects over smaller investments that may attract less 
attention. The Green Impact Zone’s accomplishments, which are outlined in the next section, 
reveal a desire and an ability to grab headlines by attracting major investments in large-scale 
projects. Often called “catalytic projects” or “catalytic investments,” the Green Impact Zone 
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model is based on the idea that investments at this size are sufficient to attract continued 
resources from other investors (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2014, pp. 1-2).   
 In order to successfully revitalize neighborhoods, it is necessary to simultaneously 
target the “multiple causes of disinvestment” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b, 
para. 3). In the Neighborhood Revitalization Model, it is required that investments are 
targeted towards the “physical infrastructure” and the “human fabric”; therefore, people and 
place (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b, para. 3). Although the previous element, 
scale, argues for the value of major catalytic investments, it is also essential to ensure that 
resources are channeled towards residences directly. Investments in the human fabric of the 
neighborhoods typically took the form of job-skills training, leadership workshops, and 
community events. The construction of community centers and community job incubators are 
examples of investments that contribute to both the improvement of the physical 
infrastructure and the human fabric of the Green Impact Zone. 
 The Green Impact Zone often acted as a bridge between the communities themselves 
and outside organizations. It is not possible to rely solely on resources available within the 
community; it is also necessary to attract “people and organizations who have the necessary 
resources and expertise to help achieve long-term, sustainable change” (Green Impact Zone 
of Missouri, 2016b, para. 4). 
 An in-depth evaluation of the Green Impact Zone model was submitted by 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology master’s student Leila Borzog in June of 2010. Her 
thesis, titled Spatializing Social Equity through Place-Based Policies: Lessons from the 
Green Impact Zone of Missouri, in Kansas City, MO, is about the early portion of the Green 
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Impact Zone’s history. In 2009 and 2010, the time that Bozorg was writing her thesis, the 
initiative had undertaken very few major projects, and therefore could not be evaluated on 
much more than goals and statements made by those directly and indirectly involved.  
 Bozorg (2010) characterized the major strengths of the Green Impact Zone’s model as 
“political will and commitment to equity, a strong coalition-building process, a regional-local 
organizational structure, attention to the intersection of social and spatial concerns, and the 
creation of linkages across scales and capacities” (p. 59). This praise is mostly directed 
towards the areas of need that the Green Impact Zone chose to target and the manner in 
which the Green Impact Zone utilized its own staff and its partners. 
 When the Green Impact Zone selected its priorities for neighborhood transformation, 
it relied heavily on input from neighborhood leaders and other neighborhood representatives. 
This bottom-up organizational structure is central to the Green Impact Zone’s goal of 
building neighborhood capacity because it trains residents to envision their ideal 
neighborhood. In a Green Impact Zone promotional video, Director Anita Maltbia stated, 
“The strongest outcome that we could possibly realize is that we have helped to build 
capacity within the neighborhoods that leads to sustainability” (Mid-America Regional 
Council, 2016, n.p.). Engaging the community like this also means the changes that take 
place in the community are changes that the residents have prioritized and the neighborhoods 
are moving towards that shared vision of an ideal neighborhood.  
From the White House to MARC and Cleaver to Council Members Circo and Riley, 
Bozorg commends all the people who made resources available to start the Green Impact 
Zone. It required strong wills and perseverance to take one a project such as this and make 
 72 
 
sure it successfully got off the ground. These organizers also deserve recognition for 
attracting strong support for the initiative in a short period of time. The combination of 
Cleaver and MARC’s reputation with the neighborhood partners’ network of supporters led 
to a very diverse and productive support structure (Bozorg, 2010). 
With a staff and an office funded, a model developed, vision codified, and a wide 
platform of support from the neighborhood in place, the Green Impact Zone was ready to 
begin the process of comprehensive neighborhood change in Kansas City, Missouri. A series 
of catalytic investments would garner major headlines, and constant energy would be 
invested into the human fabric of these communities.14 By the time it was all over, however, 
the critics were louder than ever, and even some of those involved felt that they failed to live 
up to the expectations. 
The Green Impact Zone Accomplishments 
 The Green Impact Zone operated from the announcement in September 2009 until a 
lack of funding forced them to close on January 24, 2014. In the four-plus years that the 
Green Impact Zone operated, an investment of $4.2 million from Kansas City, Missouri 
generated $166 million in public and private grants. This money funded numerous projects 
focused across eight priorities for neighborhood transformation: housing, weatherization, 
employment and training, public safety and community service, energy and water 
                                                          
14 National and local articles about the Green Impact Zone include The Kansas City Star’s Plan Aims to Reverse 
Urban Core’s Decline (Hendricks, 2012), Greenforall.com’s What a Recovery Fueled Green Impact Zone Can 
Do for a Troubled City (Grady, n.d.), The Brookings Institution’s Design Snapshot – Kansas City’s Green 
Impact Zone: Targeting ARRA for Neighborhood Uplift (Muro & Rahman, 2009), and The Atlantic’s Turning 
Mean Streets into Green Streets (Merkelson, 2010).  
 73 
 
conservation, urban gardening and food, infrastructure, and youth. These eight priorities can 
be grouped into three strategy areas: Neighborhoods, Economy, and Infrastructure.  
Neighborhoods 
 Bancroft Elementary School was built in 1904 at 4300 Tracy, putting it right in the 
heart of today’s Historic Manheim Park neighborhood. In 1999 Bancroft shut its doors, 
leaving a gaping hole in an already declining neighborhood. The plan for a Bancroft 
Elementary renovation dated back to 2008 when a series of meetings between residents and 
representatives from architectural firm BNIM started exploring ways to revitalize Manheim 
Park. Together, they identified the school as a potential catalytic project, one that could 
provide needed housing and a variety of community services as well. According to one 
architect at BNIM, 
Schools are designed and built to be the center of a community, and when they go 
dark it’s a sign that the neighborhood is in serious decline … Manheim Park, in their 
collaborative dialogue of discovery … identified a perfect place for urban 
acupuncture. (Hendricks, 2014, para. 18). 
 
Less than a year after these exploratory meetings Emanuel Cleaver II announced the creation 
of the Green Impact Zone. 
 In early 2011, the Green Impact Zone hosted representatives from the Make It Right 
Foundation, an organization founded by actor Brad Pitt to build “safe, Cradle to Cradle 
inspired homes” in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Make it Right, 2016a). The term 
“cradle to cradle” describes a manufacturing process that uses materials that can easily be 
recycled or “down-cycled” and turned into other useful products, thus extending the life of 
the materials used in the manufacturing process. 
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According to press releases and statements made by the Green Impact Zone, Brad 
Pitt’s organization was very excited about the work that the Green Impact Zone was doing 
and was looking for ways to get involved. A Green Impact Zone press release (2012b) stated 
that “after numerous tours and meetings with Green Impact Zone staff and neighborhood 
leaders, the foundation focused on the Bancroft School building” (p. 1). Together with 
partners Dalmark Development Group of Kansas City, Missouri, Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Kansas City, Inc., BNIM Architects, the Historic Manheim Park Neighborhood 
Association, and MARC, the project became a reality.  
The project would create 50 rent-controlled one-, two-, and three-bedroom units 
intended for “youth transitioning out of foster care, veterans and low-income families;” 29 in 
the remodeled school building and 21 in new townhomes to be constructed on the school 
grounds (Make It Right, 2016b, para. 3) (see Figure 4). The design also called for the school 
to house a community center boasting “an auditorium, gymnasium, locker rooms, technology 
lab, job training center, medical clinic, grocery store and other retail space, along with 
community gardens, a playground, walking trail and police foot patrol office” (Cadena, 2012, 
para. 5). Like all construction by Make It Right, the Bancroft School redevelopment would 
be LEED Platinum certified. The proposed design by BNIM won a Social Economic 
Environmental Design (SEED) award, which recognizes excellence in public-interest design. 
The Bancroft project was one of six SEED honorees selected from among 45 submissions 
from 14 countries (Green Impact Zone, 2012b). The Green Impact Zone also worked with 
community organizations to create a workforce development plan to provide training and 
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skill development for area residents, employment opportunities on the Bancroft project itself, 
and capacity building for community organizations (BNIM Architecture, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. New Townhomes Designed by BNIM. Source: Thebancroftschool.com, 2016. 
 
The project would cost a total of $14 million. Along with the Make It Right 
Foundation’s donation of $2.3 million, $1.4 million came from federal and state low-income 
housing tax credits, $3 million in federal and state historic preservation tax credits, and 
$676,000 in Affordable Housing Assistance Program tax credits. When crews broke ground 
at 4300 Tracy, Cleaver called it “a momentous day for the Green Impact Zone, the Manheim 
neighborhood and all of Kansas City,” (Cadena, 2012, para. 10) and Anita Maltbia said, 
The Bancroft project is an excellent example of what can happen when needs 
identified by a community are paired with resources that are willing to strategically 
invest in them. The Green Impact Zone joins the Historic Manheim Park 
neighborhood in its appreciation of the many partners who have come forward to not 
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only develop much needed housing but to also bolster the hope of many for the 
revitalization of the central core of Kansas City. (Cadena, 2012, para. 15 ) 
 
The success of the Bancroft School redevelopment (and the involvement of leading 
man Brad Pitt) garnered national headlines, further bolstering the hope for Kansas City’s 
central core. So much attention was being given to the Manheim Park neighborhood that the 
Green Impact Zone was worried that outside investors would begin to buy up many tracts of 
land and hold them until property values climbed high enough to resell them at a tidy profit. 
To this end, the Green Impact Zone met with the Land Trust and Land Bank of Jackson 
County, two related government organizations that were “established by state law to sell 
properties that have failed to sell on the courthouse steps to satisfy unpaid taxes” (Land Trust 
of Jackson County, 2016, para. 1). These meetings were used by the Green Impact Zone to 
formally  
request that the commission consider community goals when transferring properties 
in and around the zone to new owners. As more national and local attention is focused 
on the zone…there are concerns about speculators snapping up Land Trust properties 
purely for financial gain, without understanding community revitalization goals. 
(Green Impact Zone, 2012a, p. 2) 
 
Community revitalization goals were centered on the Bancroft School renovation 
project as a catalyst. The 2012 Manheim Park Development Strategy publication identifies 
the Bancroft School as the center of a two-square-block area called the Bancroft Activity 
Center (see Figure 5). The authors explain that the Bancroft Activity Center: 
focuses on the Bancroft School redevelopment, the 43rd Street/Troost Avenue 
Intersection, and the immediately adjacent blocks. This focused concept applies the 
design principles of the Green Impact Zone and Neighborhood Concepts while 
incorporating existing building and site conditions, ownership information, known 
development opportunities, and existing City projects to develop tailored strategies 
for development and infrastructure. The Bancroft Activity Center concept is an 
important tool for on-the-ground implementation of the Neighborhood Concept Plan 
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in one particular location, but it also provides a blue-print for future priority 
development areas throughout the Green Impact Zone. (BNIM, 2012, p. 11) 
 
The plan called for a combination of renovations and new constructions to take place on the 
4300 block of Tracy, the block that faces the new Bancroft School building. A variety of 
densities and styles of homes were called for. This area was to serve as a model block with 
the belief that focusing resources in one area of the neighborhood would “create a critical  
 
Figure 5. Renovated Bancroft School Building. Source: Thebancroftschool.com, 2016. 
 
mass of redevelopment that can anchor other infill development throughout the 
neighborhood” (BNIM, 2012, p. 16). The Bancroft Activity Center Concept also called for an 
expansion of green space throughout the neighborhood, an emphasis on walkability and bike-
ability, access to public transportation, and an increase in mixed-use renovations along the 
Troost and 43rd Street corridors. 
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The Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council took on a similar, albeit smaller and less 
recognized, project involving a blighted school located centrally in its neighborhood. Horace 
Mann School was located at 39th Street and U.S. Highway 71 (Bruce R. Watkins Drive), and 
was built before 1900. A nonprofit Christian school then bought and used the property until 
1991, when the building was vacated permanently and was subject to vandalism and 
numerous fires afterward. In 2007 the Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, led by Margaret May, 
began talks with the development company Prairie Dog. Their talks centered on plans to 
redevelop the school into apartments for seniors. However, disagreements between the 
Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council and Prairie Dog drove the two parties to court, and in 2008 a 
judge ruled in favor of Ivanhoe’s plans to construct senior apartments. Over the next few 
years, the Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council focused on generating the necessary funding until 
December of 2011, when the old Horace Mann School building caught fire. The fire was 
severe, and damage was extensive enough to make the building unusable. In 2012 the 
Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, the Green Impact Zone of Missouri, and housing consultant 
APD announced “plans for a catalyst project along 39th Street.…The 39th Street Gateway 
would include mixed-income, multi-phased development – including duplexes, senior 
cottages, and single-family homes – on the former Horace Mann School site” (Green Impact 
Zone, 2012e, p. 7). 
 As of June 2016, the Horace Mann School demolition and phases I and II of 
redevelopment were completed. Phase I included the construction of an Aldi grocery store at 
39th and Prospect and the construction of seven duplexes begun in 2013 and was completed 
by the end of 2015 (Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Greater Kansas City [LISC], 
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2014). Phase II includes 12 one-story cottages for low-income seniors age 55 or older. Phase 
III is to focus on acquisition/rehab of vacant abandoned houses and grant-funded home 
repairs for low-income residents throughout the project area. Phase IV includes construction 
of mixed-use buildings along 39th Street from Euclid to Brooklyn, with commercial 
businesses/social services available on the ground floor and residential housing on the upper 
floors. 
 The Town Fork Creek and Blue Hills neighborhood associations celebrated the grand 
opening of the new Mary L. Kelly Community Center on September 17, 2013 (see Figure 6). 
This facility will perform many functions, including: café, gymnasium, dance studio, 
computer lab, GED classes and office space for both the Town Fork Creek and Blue Hills 
neighborhood associations (Green Impact Zone, 2013a). Two businesses began to meet the 
demands of operating the Mary L. Kelly Center: a catering business and a transportation 
business. The catering business was created to fill the need for students to be fed during their 
after-school and summer programs, and the transportation business was formed with the 
purpose of getting neighborhood children to their activities at the Mary L. Kelly Center. Both 
businesses have begun to expand. The catering business employs over 20 people and now 
serves events at the Center and beyond. The transportation business operates a fleet of 22 
busses and now serves Hogan Preparatory Academy’s student bussing needs (Economic 
Development Corporation KC, 2016). 
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Figure 6. Exterior of the Mary L. Kelly Community Center. Source: KCtechschool.com, 
2016. 
 Area residents are able to earn the right to use the facility by assisting the center in 
one of their many programs. This method, known as Time Banking, encourages a greater 
level of investment in the success of the center without requiring any financial commitment. 
The program’s residents can “focus on community outreach, such as the care of the elderly, 
business development help and home repair” (Time banking, 2016, para 2). 
The $2 million investment in the project came from philanthropists Joe and Jeanne 
Brandmeyer, founders and former owners of Enturia Inc., an antiseptic company. They chose 
to name the center after longtime resident and community activist Mary L. Kelly. The Upper 
Room, a Kansas City non-profit focused on providing out-of-school education programs to 
low-income families, owns the building. Daily operation is managed by neighborhood 
leaders and community volunteers. The Mary Kelly Center is the anchor in a “larger 
initiative to revitalize the economically depressed Blue Hills and [Town Fork Creek] 
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neighborhoods to improve housing and increase employment opportunities and overall 
quality of life for residents” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2013a, para. 4). 
Economy 
 On the southern edge of the Green Impact Zone, between Town Fork Creek and 
49-63/Troostwood is the Blue Hills neighborhood. During the 1960s this neighborhood 
shifted from majority Caucasian to 90% African American and is still so today. Blue Hills 
was hurt badly by high numbers of foreclosures, especially in response to the predatory 
lending practices that had become more frequent by 2006 and continued until the recession in 
2008. 
 Despite these challenges, the Blue Hills neighborhood is a place with hopeful 
residents. It is home to not‐for-profit Community Development Corporation Blue Hills 
Community Services (BHCS) and the active Blue Hills Neighborhood Association, making 
the Blue Hills neighborhood one of the most organized and productive in all of Kansas City. 
Additionally, the presence of Swope Community Builders and Kansas City Neighborhood 
Alliance and the fact that Blue Hills is within one of the Local Initiative Support 
Corporation’s NeighborhoodsNOW target areas make this neighborhood even stronger.15  
Blue Hills Community Services saw an opportunity, acquired the four-acre site at 
50th and Prospect in 2007 and began working with neighborhood residents, 
community service organizations, city officials and city staff to create a development 
plan that would begin to reverse the negative trends impacting the Prospect Corridor 
and create a statement of reinvestment within the urban core of Kansas City. (Blue 
Hills Community Services, 2016, para. 1) 
 
                                                          
15 NeighborhoodsNOW is a comprehensive neighborhood revitalization program from LISC of Greater Kansas 
City, a local branch of the national organization Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC). LISC is one of 
the largest organizations in the United States designed to provide support to projects revitalizing local 
communities. 
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In 2009, Blue Hills, in partnership with LISC’s NeighborhoodsNOW staff members, 
identified economic development and jobs as one of the most pressing issues facing the 
community. They created a plan to encourage new businesses to locate on Prospect Avenue 
by creating an adult-workforce training program by the end of 2012. This plan would work in 
conjunction with an “entrepreneurship program for green companies…that open businesses 
on Prospect” (Local Initiative Support Corporation, 2009, p. 4). 
In 2012 the Green Impact Zone and Blue Hills Community Services announced a 
$3.1 million plan to redevelop an over-14,000-square-foot building at 5008 Prospect Avenue 
as a sustainable business incubator. The selection of the Prospect site was strategic for 
several reasons. Prospect was, at one time, one of Kansas City’s most thriving commercial 
corridors, and Blue Hills has long prioritized programs that would restore Prospect’s status as 
a business hub. The section of Prospect between 49th and 51st, where the incubator is 
located, is highly visible because of its proximity to Bruce R. Watkins Drive (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Exterior of the 5008 Prospect Business Incubator. Source: “5008: A Great 
Prospect,” Blue Hills Community Services, 2016. 
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“In 2006, Greater Kansas City LISC provided the original loan to acquire the building 
and land at 5008 Prospect. However, before BHCS could move forward with development 
plans, the economic downturn of 2007 happened” (LISC, 2009, p. 4). Construction at 5008 
Prospect Avenue began in August 2012 and was completed in April 2013 (Blue Hills 
Community Services, 2016) with $3.1 million in financing from the City of Kansas City’s 
EnergyWorksKC grant, which was made possible by the America Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. Additional funding was provided by the Community 
Development Block Grant program, an acquisition and predevelopment loan from Greater 
Kansas City LISC, and philanthropic support from community partners. 
The site is owned by Blue Hills Community Services and offers 7,900 square feet of 
office space. It operates as a multi-tenant facility, specifically serving small business 
construction contractors with office space, training and resources to grow their business, and 
networking with experienced professionals. There is plenty of additional space to provide 
neighborhood groups with a community meeting space.  
The incubator is also meant to foster sustainability. A major focus of the training 
resources is on how to operate a construction company more sustainably, and by 2015 the 
contractor incubator assisted nine businesses, with one slot open (Alonzo, 2015). The 5008 
Prospect building itself was awarded the LEED Gold standard for its numerous sustainable 
features including: daylight harvesting technology, occupancy-sensing lighting controls, 
Energy Star heating and cooling and appliances, a 60% rainwater run-off retention with a 
6,500-gallon rain cistern, solar panels, and electric-vehicle charging stations (Blue Hills 
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Community Services, 2016). These many sustainable features are expected to reduce the cost 
of operating the facility and keep rent low for small business tenants. 
As noted previously, this business incubator is seen as a big step towards a 
revitalization of the Blue Hills Neighborhood and the Prospect corridor specifically. 
According to LISC:  
The building will serve as a catalyst for revitalization along the Prospect Corridor and 
will launch development that will move south connecting two tax increment financial 
districts. It will be essential to the neighborhood by providing job creation and career 
development opportunities for low-income residents, training and business 
development for neighborhood contractors, and community development programs 
and services. (Mid-America Regional Council, 2009, p. 2) 
 
This incubator also serves as a command center of sorts for the many different 
revitalization projects going on throughout the community, especially on Blue Hills’ 
northeast-side Wabash Village Urban Renewal Area. As early as 2003, Blue Hills 
Neighborhood Association was making plans to turn around this largely vacant area of its 
neighborhood by building “single-family homes, town homes and duplexes, building a new 
charter school, and reusing the Francis Willard School as senior housing” (LISC, 2006, p. 5). 
These plans are being carried out, and much of the work is being done by the very 
contractors that occupy 5008 Prospect. The new 5008 incubator is located within this 
Wabash Village Initiative, and it therefore “will allow Blue Hills Community Services to 
fulfill its mission from within the targeted impact area and expand service opportunities with 
the [5008 business incubator] and additional space for complementary service-based 
organizations” (Blue Hills Community Services, 2013, p. 4). 
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Infrastructure 
 One of the first grants for which MARC and the Green Impact Zone applied was in 
2009 for funds from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Transportation Investments 
Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program. This grant application sought $88.761 
million of the $48.1 billion that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 set 
aside for transportation investments. Of the $88 million that MARC applied for, $26.20 
million was targeted for the Green Impact Zone. Although the majority of the funding would 
be spent outside of the Green Impact Zone, MARC described the purpose of the grant as a 
tool to connect the central city to resources throughout the region:  
The regional application aims to demonstrate how focused investments in our urban 
core through the Green Impact Zone and supporting transportation connections will 
lead to revitalized neighborhoods and expanded economic opportunity regionwide, 
ultimately providing a national model of place-based, interdisciplinary planning and 
coordination. (Mid-America Regional Council, 2009, p. 2) 
 
 If awarded, the $26.2 million would fund a “multifaceted investment strategy around 
sustainability, public safety, stabilization, housing conditions, access to jobs and services and 
economic vitality” (Mid-America Regional Council, 2009, p. 3). Specifically, the money 
would be dispersed according to Table 7. The application also showed that if awarded 
TIGER funding, $6.4 million dollars would be added from local sources to assist with the 
Sidewalks/Streetscape/ Transit Improvements and construction/design projects involving 
Troost Bridge, which borders the Green Impact Zone.  
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Table 7 
Green Impact Zone TIGER Investments 
Green Impact Zone TIGER Investments (millions) 
Sidewalks / Streetscape / Transit 
Improvements 
$8.10 
Street Rehabilitation $6.00 
Traffic Signal Upgrades $2.20 
Traffic Signal Interconnect $1.90 
Troost Bridge Replacement $8.00 
TOTAL $26.20 
Note. From Kansas City Regional TIGER Grant Application, by Mid-America Regional 
Council, 2009, p. 3. 
 
 
 After reviewing the application, the U.S. Department of Transportation awarded 
MARC a $50 million TIGER grant. Although the total funding was less than requested, the 
amount slated for improvements within the Green Impact Zone remained at $26.20 million. 
This federal commitment to fully funding the projects within the Green Impact Zone signaled 
a belief in the potential of this model.  
The Green Impact Zone’s improvements implemented many of the necessary 
elements of a successful network of hybrid-electric rapid commuter buses. Crumbling 
sidewalks, curbs, and driveways dissuaded residents from walking throughout the zone and 
endangered pedestrians. More than 11 miles of new sidewalks and walkways now lead to 18 
updated transit stops featuring brand new amenities including “shelters, benches, real-time 
signs, bus pull-outs and pads, and solar lighting” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016c, 
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para. 4). These improvements take place along the city’s highest ridership corridor, including 
the Green Impact Zone (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b). 
 Those driving in the Zone benefit from the 22.9 miles of streets and curbs that were 
resurfaced and rebuilt with TIGER money. Traffic filters through the Zone more efficiently 
due to the implementation of 12 new traffic signals and 14.1 miles of signal interconnection 
to facilitate traffic flow (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2014).  
 The final project to be completed with TIGER dollars was the Troost Avenue 
vehicular/pedestrian bridge (see Figure 8). Troost’s original bridge over Brush Creek was 
built as part of the Federal Highway Act of 1956. This badly deteriorated, poured-cement 
overpass had very narrow margins for pedestrians and was an example of the car-centric 
designs of that era. Its replacement, constructed by HNTB with artistic support from the 
architectural firm El Dorado, Inc. and lighting designer Derek Porter Studio, was built with 
the motto “it’s more than just a bridge.” This motto’s meaning is twofold. In addition to the 
construction of a bridge, the HNTB-led project called for an array of improvements to the 
surrounding site, including 
1,200 feet of intersection improvements at both Troost Avenue and Volker 
Boulevard; channel improvements; a new pedestrian bridge over Brush Creek; and 
construction of nearly 3,000 feet of a 10-foot-wide concrete multiuse path, reflecting 
pools and rain gardens that create an urban “river walk” along Brush Creek. 
(Feuerborn, 2012, p. 1) 
 
The channel improvements were especially overdue, having been stalled due to lack of 
funding since the study following the fatal flooding of Brush Creek in 1977 (Feuerborn, 
2012).  
 
 88 
 
 
Figure 8. Troost Avenue Bridge at 48th Street Crossing over Brush Creek. Source: El 
Dorado website, eldo.us, 2012). 
 
 
 
 Although Troost Avenue and the new bridge run north and south, this project was 
presented as an opportunity to build a much needed “bridge” between the neighborhoods east 
and west of Troost. Given that Troost has long been considered Kansas City’s most infamous 
racial and economic dividing line, the Green Impact Zone and its partners used the 
construction of Troost Bridge as a symbol for connecting communities on either side of 
Troost, even though it did not really do so. The completion of the project was celebrated at 
the “Meet Me at the Bridge” street festival on May 5, 2012. The Green Impact Zone’s 
website described the setting: “the setting of this event on Kansas City’s racial and economic 
dividing line symbolizes how communities can come together to improve their quality of life 
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with bridged understanding, cooperation and focused intent to transform neighborhoods into 
sustainable places” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2012d, para. 4). 
The materials and design also invoked a spirit of bringing people together.  
By enhancing the barrier that separates cars from people, the team was able to break 
down the barrier between people and the surrounding site. To that end, the architects 
lined the perimeter of the bridge with 10-foot-tall, five-ply laminated glass panels—
held in place by embedded stainless steel hardware and compression clamp plates—
enclosing an 8-foot-wide poured-in-place sidewalk on the western edge, and a 10-
foot-wide walkway on the east. Animating the experience, convex reflective stainless 
steel panels are affixed at ground level to heavy concrete dividing walls that separate 
these pedestrian zones from the central traffic lanes and create a fun-house mirror 
effect, which bus passengers see reflected in the glass panels from their elevated 
seats. Embedded linear LEDs provide pedestrian lighting—their effect amplified by 
the glass and steel panels at night. (Troost Bridge: El Dorado, 2013, para. 2) 
 
Another early Green Impact Zone project was the Low Income Weatherization 
Assistance Program (LIWAP). Weatherization, according to the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program,  
[d]iffers in many ways from what is commonly called “weatherizing your home.” 
The latter involves low-cost improvements like adding weather-stripping to doors 
and windows to save energy. These measures made up the services WAP provided in 
its early years and are likely responsible for the program's name. Today, WAP's 
weatherization services consist of cost-effective energy efficiency measures for 
existing residential and multifamily housing with low-income residents. Under this 
definition, it includes a wide variety of energy efficiency measures that encompass 
the building envelope, its heating and cooling systems, its electrical system, and 
electricity consuming appliance (Energy.gov, n.d., para. 5) 
 
For the purposes of weatherizing homes in the Green Impact Zone, $4.2 million in 
federal stimulus was awarded to MARC and the Green Impact Zone through the Missouri 
Department of Energy in 2009. This money funded the Green Impact Zone’s Low-Income 
Weatherization Assistance Program, the purpose of which was to provide homeowners with 
long-term savings on energy bills while simultaneously reducing the carbon footprint of the 
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neighborhood. Additionally, the newly created jobs as energy auditors, construction workers, 
and related laborers, and customer service representatives were to be filled by residents of the 
Zone.  
A household was required to fill out an application in order to be considered for 
weatherization assistance. In order to qualify, a household needed to have an annual income 
below the maximum annual income allowed based on the number of people in the household, 
for example, a household of four, to qualify, would have a maximum income of $47,100. If a 
household’s income qualified, an auditor would visit the home to perform a full inspection to 
determine what changes and renovations were needed and what would be covered by the 
program. After the audit, the weatherization work was ordered and performed by the 
contractors. All work was subject to a second audit and quality check to ensure the resident 
received the necessary work.  
A program that began with the promise to weatherize every home in the Green Impact 
Zone in one year fell very short of that goal. That promise, made by Congressman Cleaver, 
was made with a combination of misunderstandings and assumptions. The LIWAP was 
delayed months because it lacked the information required to determine a prevailing wage, a 
requirement for all public works projects under the Davis-Bacon Act.16 Also, Cleaver’s plan 
to target Missouri Department of Energy dollars to the Green Impact Zone alone was 
determined to be impossible under current law. That funding was required to be spent across 
                                                          
16 The Davis-Bacon Act requires contractors for federal or federally assisted construction projects to pay 
production workers no less than prevailing wages and benefits. The Department of Labor, which administers the 
Act, defines “prevailing wage rate” as (a) The rate of wages paid in the area in which the work is to be 
performed, to the majority of those employed in that classification in construction in the area similar to the 
proposed undertaking; (b) In the event that there is not a majority paid at the same rate, then the rate paid to the 
greater number; Provided, Such greater number constitutes 30% of those employed; or (c) in the event that less 
than 30% of those so employed receive the same rate, then the average rate. 
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the entire city, which limited what could be spent on homes in such a small area of Kansas 
City. Beyond all these delays and bureaucratic hurdles, it was eventually discovered that 
many of the homes in the Green Impact Zone were not eligible to receive LIWAP services. 
Per ARRA regulations, if a home had been a recipient of funds from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development after September 30, 1994, it was disqualified from 
weatherization programs (Reames, 2016).  
Significant delays resulted from these numerous obstacles, leading the Missouri 
Department of Natural Resources to reduce MARC’s funding from $4.5 million to $2.7 
million. A few months later (September 2011), while the Missouri DNR continued to doubt 
MARC’s competency in this matter, it terminated its contract with MARC entirely, citing 
“production and oversight issues” (Helling, 2011). The City of Kansas City was given the 
contract and much of the unspent grant money. However, the transferred stimulus money 
needed to be spent less than six months after being transferred to the City or it would be lost.  
Of the homes in the Green Impact Zone that would have benefited from 
weatherization (1,000 or more homes), only a fraction of them were weatherized. The exact 
number of homes that received treatment, however, is contested. According to the 
infographic released by the Green Impact Zone in its final days, “329+” homes were 
weatherized. In an article published by The Kansas City Star after the Green Impact Zone 
closed its doors, Rick Montgomery (2014) wrote that fewer than 200 homes received 
weatherization treatment, and that the LIWAP cost a total of $2.7 million.  
In 2009 Kansas City Power and Light (KCP&L), the city’s electrical company, was 
awarded a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy through the American Recovery and 
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Reinvestment Act for the purpose of creating a “smart grid demonstration area” covering all 
of the Green Impact Zone and beyond. The full demonstration area was to serve 19,960 
individuals in 11,265 homes, with the Green Impact Zone accounting for 8,374 of the total 
individuals (42%) and 2,897 (26%) of the homes. The project cost a total of $48 million, with 
$24 million coming from the federal grant and another $24 million matching investment by 
KCP&L and partners (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2012c).  
Starting with a state of the art “SmartSubstation,” the Green Impact Zone Smart Grid 
Demonstration project is the first “end-to-end SmartGrid” in Kansas City. “Smart” is used 
here to describe the ability of the system to provide energy more efficiently than a standard 
grid while also providing real-time feedback about each home’s energy use. The term end-to-
end signifies that all of the old system has been removed and a new “smart” system has been 
fully constructed.17 An end-to-end smart grid is the most efficient way of providing energy in 
Kansas City. This grid is also valuable because it can “accommodate new sources of 
renewable and distributed energy supply” as it becomes available (KCP&L SmartGrid Pilot 
and Energy Optimizer Program, 2010, p. 4). To capitalize on the grid’s ability to provide 
real-time feedback, homes were equipped with “smart meters.” These in-home devices track 
and record all energy usage for a household, providing customers with the tools to manage 
their usage and therefore reduce their electrical bills. This system results in money saved on 
monthly energy bills and reduces the carbon footprint of each home, while educating zone 
residents about the value of reducing their energy usage (KCP&L SmartGrid Pilot and 
Energy Optimizer Program, 2010).   
                                                          
17 Energy is generated from SmartGeneration and through a SmartSubstation it travels through 
SmartDistribution to SmartEndUse (“KCP&L SmartGrid Pilot and Energy Optimizer Program,” 2010, p. 4). 
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Another major piece of the SmartGrid Demonstration project is the SmartGrid 
Innovation Park. Emphasizing the “demonstration” in SmartGrid Demonstration, this 
educational park is located at 4724 Tracy Avenue in the Ivanhoe Neighborhood. According 
to the Green Impact Zone’s blog:  
The SmartGrid Innovation Park contains a walking path and sitting plaza that 
surround a large, sophisticated lithium ion battery and a solar panel array — both of 
which help the grid meet the energy needs of people who live and work within the 
SmartGrid Demonstration Area. It also houses an electric vehicle charging station and 
an information kiosk. The park is open seven days a week and admission is free. 
(Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2012c, para. 4). 
 
In October 2011, a related project was completed. The Paseo Academy of Fine and 
Performing Arts, located at 4747 Flora Ave in the Blue Hills Neighborhood, is the site of the 
largest solar energy system in the entire metro area. Not only will this 100kW system 
generate power for the school, it will also allow students and teachers to learn about the way 
solar power works. In total, 14,000 smart meters were provided free of charge to homes and 
businesses in the Green Impact Zone Smart Grid Demonstration area.  
Human Capital 
 Major construction projects such as the ones described above often get the most 
attention from those outside the community, but for Zone residents who are struggling, direct 
training and assistance is necessary. The Green Impact Zone offered a variety of programs 
that invested in the men, women, and children living in the Zone because it was understood 
that the only way to transform the future of this community was through the residents. 
According to the Green Impact Zone website, “Successful community redevelopment 
requires that the multiple causes of disinvestment be tackled simultaneously. Investment in 
the physical infrastructure of the community cannot bring about transformation without also 
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investing in the human fabric of the community” (Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016b, 
para 3). 
 When the Green Impact Zone began, it was estimated that there was up to 50% 
unemployment in some parts of it. Unemployment and underemployment had led to 37% of 
residents living in poverty and a median household income of $22,712 (Green Impact Zone 
of Missouri, 2014). Because finding jobs for residents was such a critical part of the effort to 
transform this community, many of the programs the Green Impact Zone offered focused on 
employment. The largest of such programs was the Essential Employability Skills (EES) 
Workshops. 
 With partners Metropolitan Community Colleges, the Full Employment Council, and 
local businesses, the Green Impact Zone developed the curriculum for the Essential 
Employability Skills workshops.18 First offered in 2011, this curriculum was presented as a 
weeklong series of workshops that taught fundamental skills necessary for employment in 
any field. Topics included: proper business appearance, resume-writing skills, computer 
literacy, interviewing skills, and professional attitude and work ethic. The EES program’s 
focus on these skills, sometimes referred to as “soft skills,” is intentionally complementary to 
                                                          
18 The Full Employment Council, according to its website (2014), was created through the efforts of the Greater 
Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, the Civic Council of Greater Kansas City, the City of Kansas City, 
Missouri, and the counties of Jackson, Cass, Clay, Platte, and Ray. In 1984, a study recommended the 
consolidation of all federally-funded employment and training programs into one organization. Toward that 
end, in October of 1986, the Urban Employment Network, the Kansas City National Alliance of Businesses, the 
City of Kansas City, Missouri Private Industry Council Administration (PICA), and the Full Employment 
Council (FEC) were merged into one entity. The reorganized FEC serves as the one-stop operator and fiscal 
agent for the combined federal job-training efforts (Full Employment Council, 2014) 
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other “hard skills” programs offered by organizations such as the Full Employment Council 
and Institute for Workforce Innovation.19  
 One such “hard skills” program that was directly affiliated with the Green Impact 
Zone’s EES program was the Metropolitan Energy Center’s (MEC) courses on 
environmental remediation and abatement. Completion of MEC’s five-week intensive course 
was directly followed by enrollment in the one-week EES program, providing participants 
with the knowledge and training to get hired in a job that offered a career path in the field of 
environmental remediation. The Green Impact Zone offered a total of eight Essential 
Employability Skills Workshops that resulted in a total of 133 graduates. 
 Another job placement program that the Green Impact Zone developed was the 
hosting of the Job Fair Tent at the annual event of Convoy of Hope at Swope Park. The 
Convoy of Hope is an international faith-based program based in Springfield, Missouri, that 
provides food, clothing, and health services for at-risk families. The Green Impact Zone 
identified a strategic overlap between those attending the Convoy of Hope events in Kansas 
City and the Green Impact Zone residents for whom it sought to provide career services. The 
job-fair tent at the Convoy of Hope was developed to capitalize on this complementarity. 
Visitors to the tent sat one-on-one with human resources professionals to develop a 
professional resume; they were provided a mock-interview experience, were signed up for an 
e-mail account if needed, submitted online applications for employment, and finished by 
                                                          
19 The Institute for Workforce Innovation is a workforce training organization based in Kansas City’s 
Metropolitan Community College network. According to MCC’s website (2016 para. 4), “for workers, the 
Institute offers short-term training, certificate programs, job placement services, professional development and 
personal development… For businesses, the Institute offers an array of consulting services from assessment, 
recruitment, quality management, database solutions, and customized training, boasting the area’s only OSHA 
Training Institute Education Center”. 
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meeting with representatives from local businesses that were actively seeking to hire 
participants.  
 Another important piece of long-lasting grassroots community transformation is 
building community capacity, which involves finding potential leaders in the community and 
training them to fulfill their potential. The Green Impact Zone used the same curriculum 
developed by the Mid-America Regional Council with the city of Kansas City to offer a free 
slate of leadership training courses. Residents could take one or more of these courses and 
would receive a certificate for each two-hour session completed. Two hundred seventy-five 
residents enrolled in at least one class, and 59 completed all five. The Green Impact Zone 
credits this program for finding and developing some of the most effective community 
volunteers, and the neighborhood associations benefited as well. 
 Other programs included the NEXUS summer youth programs that were designed to 
encourage teenagers to explore career and entrepreneurship opportunities in fields of 
environmental protection and energy. The students were required to attend classroom 
sessions and field trips designed to expose them to professionals working in those fields. The 
Green Impact Zone also hosted multiple Citizens’ Police Academies. Hosted twice, each 
session was a series of classes and field trips held on seven consecutive Saturdays. This 
program had been offered regularly by the Kansas City Police Department for some time, but 
was offered only at the Regional Police Academy building (located at 6885 NE Pleasant 
Valley Road, over 13 miles to the northeast), which made it very unlikely that any Zone 
resident would attend. The Green Impact Zone successfully negotiated with the Kansas City 
Police Department to host the academy in the Zone in the summer of 2012. The Citizens’ 
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Police Academy, “operates on the premise that informed, educated residents will be more 
supportive of police officers and promote safety in their communities” (Citizens’ Police 
Academy course …, 2012).  
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CHAPTER 5 
REFLECTIONS ON THE GREEN IMPACT ZONE OF MISSOURI 
 
 When the Green Impact Zone of Missouri was announced in March of 2009, it was 
heralded by many across the nation as an excellent example of the Federal government’s 
placed-based strategy for urban reinvestment. High profile support came from the White 
House in an August 2009 memo and continued when Anita Maltbia, Director of the Green 
Impact Zone, attended the January 2010 State of the Union Address as a guest of the First 
Lady. The nationwide recognition of the Green Impact Zone led to it being commonly 
referred to as a “national model,” as in March 2010 when Federal Transit Administration 
Deputy Administrator Therese McMillan said: “This project has become a national model of 
how a federal investment will assist a community in an economic decline and transform the 
same 150 square blocks into a thriving, sustainable neighborhood” (Federal Transit 
Administration, 2010, “Livability lives in the Midwest” section). 
 Before long, the national narrative about the Green Impact Zone began to change. 
Following well-documented challenges surrounding the home weatherization program in 
2010 and 2011, one Kansas City weekly reflected that “The Green Impact Zone was 
suddenly being reframed as a story of unfulfilled potential” (Bender, 2013, p. 3). By the time 
the Green Impact Zone closed its doors in 2014, the promising future had given way to what 
most national critics considered a lost opportunity. In a Time magazine article, David Von 
Drehle pointed out what he thought were examples of money being spent on the wrong 
projects in the Green Impact Zone: “ARRA has left the Green Impact Zone ready for the day 
when poor and working class Kansas Citians start driving electric cars. But it doesn’t seem to 
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have done much to generate the jobs they need to pay for new low-carbon buggies” (von 
Drehle, 2014, para. 8). 
 Somewhere between the early supporters’ lofty aspirations and the critics’ derisive 
retrospectives is the reality of the Green Impact Zone of Missouri. The initiative could have 
gone more smoothly, could have been executed more efficiently, and Congressman Cleaver 
was right when he said that those in charge “left tens of millions of federal dollars on the 
table.” On the other hand, hundreds of millions of federal dollars were successfully leveraged 
for the Green Impact Zone neighborhoods, and many public/private partnerships were 
established under the leadership of the Green Impact Zone. Partnerships between 
neighborhoods also blossomed during the Zone’s lifetime: Saundra Hayes, a past president of 
the Historic Manheim Park Association, was quoted in the Kansas City Star saying, “If the 
Green Impact Zone hadn’t happened, these five neighborhoods would never have worked in 
concert the way we have for a common good…I don’t see any reason for that to fall apart” 
(Montgomery, 2014, para. 13). 
 A fair evaluation of the Green Impact Zone must take into account that changing the 
trajectory of any area, but especially an area with decades of disinvestment, takes time. To 
judge ultimate success or failure at this point, seven to eight years after the Green Impact 
Zone was conceived, is still premature. One sentiment that many involved in the Zone shared 
was a belief that it took decades of disinvestment for these neighborhoods to become what 
they were, and it will take decades of strategic investment for this area to see its full 
potential. What follows is not an attempt to label the initiative a success or failure, but an 
opportunity for those who were deeply involved in the Green Impact Zone to reflect on their 
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personal experiences with the initiative. Regardless of how the reputation of the Green 
Impact Zone changes over time, the honest assessments of those involved should be used by 
future place-based initiatives as a learning opportunity.  
 Correspondence with personnel involved with the zone was conducted during the first 
half of 2016. The respondents were promised they would remain anonymous to ensure that 
they could speak openly about their experiences without repercussions. The first round of 
questionnaires went to people with a range of different experiences with the Green Impact 
Zone of Missouri, including residents living in the area, area organizers, politicians, and 
members of the Green Impact Zone initiative. Those who responded to the first round of 
questionnaires recommended new people who should be contacted. This method, sometimes 
referred to as the “snowball sampling” method, helped ensure that enough people were 
contacted and that those who were contacted represented a range of Green Impact Zone 
partners. In total, 27 individuals were contacted using this method, and 13 of them provided 
responses. 
 The questionnaire (see Appendix) was an 11-question survey; the questions ranged 
from the general, about grass-roots community development, to the specifics about the Green 
Impact Zone of Missouri. The questions were designed to obtain the opinions of the 
respondents on a variety of topics such as: place-based investment vs. people-based 
investment; minority neighborhoods; community engagement and resident involvement in 
the fate of an area; and an assessment of the Green Impact Zone’s goals, successes, failures, 
and legacy. The questionnaire ended with a request for the respondent to recommend other 
people to be contacted. 
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People vs. Place 
 At the center of the Green Impact Zone model is a belief that investing time, money, 
and energy into the built environment and neighborhood residents is a powerful way of 
transforming a place. Place-based investment is not universally supported as a model of 
community development, but it did have strong support from the Federal government during 
the years the Green Impact Zone was in operation. Those, such as Barack Obama, who favor 
place-based investment over direct payments to individuals in poverty tend to argue that 
investing in a place is more likely to have longer-term and larger-scale impacts on the 
neighborhood and its residents.  
From discussions with respondents about the goals and effectiveness of place-based 
investment I came to appreciate that their experiences left them with favorable opinions of 
the Green Impact Zone model. Everyone expressed a belief that resources will have a greater 
impact on the long-term health and well-being of an area if they are pooled together and 
invested in large-scale projects, such as those overseen in the Green Impact Zone. Multiple 
respondents argued that placed-based investment was more equipped to tackle the many 
interrelated issues that face American urban poverty and disinvestment. One respondent that 
averred for this belief stated,  
Place-based initiatives attempt to address all of the many dimensions of community 
decay as an interrelated whole. You cannot fix housing if the people living in the 
housing do not have jobs so they have an income to maintain them. It is hard to stay 
healthy if the neighborhood does not encourage folks to exercise by providing 
sidewalks and parks and the neighborhood is safe. It is not enough to address one 
dimension; you really have to address all of the dimensions at once. Of course, this is 
very difficult in terms of resources, complexity, and the time it [takes] to gain 
success. (RESPONDENT #12, 2016) 
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During its existence, the Green Impact Zone operated as a facilitator between the 
local community and sources of funding, such as grants and private businesses. No major 
redevelopment project was executed by the Green Impact Zone without the close partnership 
of neighborhood organizations and community development corporations. The Green Impact 
Zone boundaries were chosen because of the active and able neighborhood organizations in 
the area, and from the beginning it was clear that the fate of the Green Impact Zone initiative 
was closely connected to its ability to work with these groups. Respondents were 
unanimously in support of a model that emphasizes local groups, and typically cited their 
intimate knowledge of the neighborhood, ability to generate involvement and feedback, and 
the fact that they had the long-term interests of the neighborhood in mind more than any 
other person or group would have. One individual described the ideal model as one in which  
money should be channeled to existing neighborhood organizations that have grown 
out of the neighborhoods; these organizations should have a plan and the capacity to 
apply the funding (and be accountable) in ways that result in re-development, 
sustainability of the neighborhood, including working with the residents, building 
capacity, and ensuring long-term growth/sustainability. (RESPONDENT #9, 2016) 
 
These groups benefited from the relationship with increased funding, new learning 
experiences, and increasing their profile within the community. On the other hand, the Green 
Impact Zone model required lots of citizen engagement and feedback in order to be 
successful, and the local groups were able to provide that. 
Community Engagement 
From the inception of the Green Impact Zone, the unwavering central tenet of the 
model was community engagement. Speaking generally about creating lasting change in a 
community, one respondent wrote that residents  
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have to be at the center of any initiative focused on their community. First, they have 
insights about the neighborhood that no one else has. They have to be at the center of 
redevelopment efforts or they will not in the end benefit from the redevelopment. 
Their role is to review plans and participate in the programming. It is about creating a 
community. (RESPONDENT #11, 2016) 
 
This response was not unique, either; everyone agreed that residents are the most 
important piece of sustainable redevelopment of a neighborhood. The timeline of resident-
driven community development was laid out by another respondent, who wrote,  
Residents are the centerpiece in re-developing their neighborhoods. Initially their 
voice is necessary to articulate the challenges of the past from their perspective and 
provide input on their hopes and visions for the future. Resident involvement is 
paramount to crafting strategy to meet development goals as well as being involved in 
sustaining gains from an initiative. When an initiative or program is over the resident 
must still “own” the vision and the change. (RESPONDENT #4, 2016) 
 
When asked about how involved residents were in the Green Impact Zone’s decision-
making process, everyone believed that residents were very involved. This level of 
engagement represents an enormous victory for the Green Impact Zone and the potential of 
the Green Impact Zone model, because anything less than very high levels of involvement 
would have rendered the initiative a failure by its own standards. Before paid staff were even 
hired, residents and neighborhood leaders met to identify the needs of the neighborhood, 
which grew into the focus areas of the Green Impact Zone. After staff were hired, residents 
and leaders of the neighborhood organizations continued to be involved, identifying 
priorities, setting goals, and participating in initiatives. In fact, the input from the 
neighborhood was taken so seriously that one respondent suggested they were able to change 
the very nature of the organization: “Residents actually decided what the main issues the 
Zone should focus on. Because of the residents’ voice the Green Impact Zone evolved from a 
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more environmentally focused initiative to one that focused on primarily quality of life 
goals” (RESPONDENT #4, 2016). 
The emphasis on community engagement continues to provide dividends for the 
neighborhood, even though the Green Impact Zone office closed on January 24, 2014. 
According to responses, residents continue to show an increased interest in the fate of their 
neighborhood when compared to the years leading up to the Green Impact Zone. Looking 
beyond the boundaries of the Green Impact Zone, one respondent wrote, “This engagement 
helped in building community capacity, demonstrating the value of the work to city leaders,” 
(RESPONDENT #9, 2016), suggesting that the community engagement model may have 
proven itself to leaders beyond the Green Impact Zone.  
Predominantly Minority Neighborhoods 
The area that became the Green Impact Zone has been shaped by a history of 
segregation and discrimination. As a result, the Green Impact Zone was an initiative that 
dealt with neighborhoods that were predominantly African American. Unique challenges and 
opportunities result from working in these conditions, and through the correspondence people 
were asked to discuss their experiences with a community development initiative such as the 
Green Impact Zone in neighborhoods with a history of segregation and disinvestment. 
Respondents acknowledged that some disadvantages of a homogenous neighborhood 
included a lack of “perspectives and potentially access to different resources. [Diversity] also 
provides residents of the neighborhood with a picture of the larger region and how to work 
with folks with different perspectives” (RESPONDENT #12, 2016). Most respondents, 
however, saw many advantages to operating with residents that share “a strong cultural 
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connection and are therefore more likely to buy in to a community-wide effort” 
(RESPONDENT #4, 2016). A cultural connection among residents was cited by another 
respondent, who wrote:  
In the case of the Green Impact Zone, the value of the neighborhoods being 
predominately minority is that the residents and neighborhood associations could 
relate to one another. There was still a high level of diversity within these minority 
neighborhoods as it relates to perspective, education, and income level, but not 
having to navigate the dynamics of racial diversity helped the focus be on quality of 
life issues. In this situation, the neighborhoods were predominately African 
Americans, which lends to a strong cultural connection. (RESPONDENT #2, 2016) 
 
Green Impact Zone Model: Goals and Mission 
 The above discussions are based on a series of general questions that, although they 
were relevant to understanding the Green Impact Zone of Missouri, were not specifically 
about the Zone. Respondents were then asked specific questions about the Green Impact 
Zone. These questions were designed to give those interviewed a chance to say, in their own 
words, what the Green Impact Zone’s successes and failures were and what the legacy of the 
initiative should be. Also, they were encouraged to make suggestions for future institutions 
that might consider using the Green Impact Zone’s model.  
 For many on the outside of the Green Impact Zone, the goals and mission were not 
easily defined, nor did they always seem consistent. Based on the responses from those who 
worked with the Zone, however, there does seem to be a clear understanding of what the 
initiative was trying to do and why. The responses to the question, “What do you think were 
the goals of the Green Impact Zone, and how well did the Green Impact Zone accomplish 
these goals?” bear out this observation. It is not much of a surprise that all of the answers to 
this question acknowledged the place-based nature of the Green Impact Zone, usually with 
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the responses explicitly using the term “place-based.” More surprising is the frequency of 
answers that mentioned that the goal was something like to catalyze foundational projects 
which have the potential to change the market dynamics of the community. Respondents also 
emphasized the focus that the Zone placed on increasing the capacity of neighborhood 
organizations to make positive change. Many felt that as a result of these efforts, the attitude 
of the residents changed from one of hopelessness to one of possibility. Others said that it 
changed the dialogue of how to accomplish change by involving an entire community 
(RESPONDENT #10, 2016, RESPONDENT #6, 2016). 
 Some responses were not as celebratory. The respondents who weren’t as impressed 
with the Green Impact Zone didn’t have anything bad to say about the process or the model, 
but they believed the promise of the zone was never realized. These respondents could see 
that everyone involved with the Green Impact Zone worked hard and had good intentions, 
but thought “it accomplished a number of individual projects, but did not accomplish its goal 
of transforming the community and its residents through a multi-dimensional place-based 
strategy” (RESPONDENT #8, 2016). 
Green Impact Zone Model: Encouraging Investment 
 From a small investment by the city of Kansas City (of $4.2 million) and a few 
partners, more than 166 million dollars in federal grants and private investments were either 
facilitated by the Green Impact Zone concept or came about as a result of zone partnerships 
(Green Impact Zone of Missouri, 2016a). No amount of money, however, would guarantee 
that the zone was a success. Without the benefit of factors such as time, leadership, and 
community participation, investments can have less impact on the quality of life of the 
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residents than expected. To explore these questions, the interviewees were asked, “How 
effective was the Green Impact Zone at leveraging public investment in the community to 
encourage long-term improvements in neighborhood quality of life characteristics such as 
housing, employment opportunity, or resident health? Please explain your answer.” Their 
responses show that even those closest to the Green Impact Zone cannot say with certainty 
what kind of long-term impact they expect from the short-lived initiative. 
 It shouldn’t be difficult to imagine how an introduction of over $166 million could 
change the trajectory of a relatively small part of Kansas City such as the Green Impact 
Zone; increased assistance, up-to-date infrastructure, and valuable education/training are only 
some of the things that Green Impact Zone leveraged investments went towards. Investments, 
however, rarely come without strings attached, and the money that went towards the zone 
was no different. At least $100 million came from federal funding, mainly through the 
ARRA, which was to be used on specific projects (Green Impact Zone, 2016a). The Green 
Impact Zone of Missouri, it seems, pursued nearly every opportunity for federal funding, not 
all of which had the potential to significantly benefit the residents. Stated one respondent: 
The Green Impact Zone leveraged a considerable amount of public investment, 
mainly through the federal stimulus program. However, much of the money came 
targeted to specific federal priorities that did not necessarily match with the needs and 
desires of the zone. For example, the zone drew over $25 million in DOE money 
matched by a similar amount of private money for the Smart Electrical Grid. 
However, this had little impact on the community’s priorities. (RESPONDENT #12, 
2016) 
 
 Surprisingly, some of the least expensive investments were the most popular; 
according to the responses provided, job and leadership training for residents, and capacity 
development for neighborhood groups showed the largest early returns and had the greatest 
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chance to change the neighborhood’s future. These answers usually came from individuals 
who described the Green Impact Zone as a “facilitator of relationships.” This role was to 
“bring attention to the zone, increase the capacity of community members and give them 
hope in the possible, focus some federal resources to improve physical conditions,” or to 
“bring partners and developers to the table; identify unique resources that partners could 
secure; bring national people (Brad Pitt) and resources to the table” (RESPONDENT #13, 
2016). Those who favored the facilitator view also argued, “It was never a goal [of the Green 
Impact Zone] to raise all the funds to change the whole community” (RESPONDENT #5, 
2016).  
Although the total dollar amount leveraged on behalf of the community seems like a 
lot, the long-term impact of the money may disappoint. A lot of money in a short time may 
be less impactful than if that money were spread out over a longer period, especially if it can 
be spent more strategically that way. Also, in the opinion of one respondent, “I don’t believe 
the Green Impact Zone existed long enough to truly see long-term quality of life 
improvements. The foundation was set with the programs and connections to opportunity but 
it’s difficult to quantify them as there weren’t long-term tracking mechanisms in place” 
(RESPONDENT #4, 2016). Another respondent lamented that some of the most important 
issues facing the community went woefully under-invested “There were limited funds 
secured for housing renovation/development and more was needed in education and 
workforce development” (RESPONDENT #1, 2016). Because so much of the money was 
earmarked, and because there was no long-term tracking mechanism, it is unlikely that the 
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money went as far as it could have, and that the impact of these investments will ever be 
fully understood. 
Green Impact Zone Model: Why Isn’t It Still in Operation? 
 Changing the trajectory of a neighborhood cannot be done overnight, or even in a few 
years. It took decades of neglect for Historic Manheim Park, Ivanhoe, Troostwood, Blue 
Hills, and Town Fork Creek to get to where they were, and it will take many years and 
significant effort to restore these areas. The Green Impact Zone of Missouri was successful at 
bringing money and attention to these neighborhoods and had the support of the city and the 
residents. Why, then, isn’t the Green Impact Zone still in operation? Respondents were asked 
to give some insight; specifically, they were asked to answer the question, “The Green 
Impact Zone initiative was awarded millions of dollars and yet it closed its doors after about 
5 years. Why do you think the Green Impact Zone was stopped/defunded, and what could it 
have done differently to still be in operation today?” 
 The first answer to this question, while true, isn’t satisfying: the Green Impact Zone 
was never intended to last longer than a few years. Although it may be true that the zone was 
conceived as a mechanism for attracting federal stimulus opportunities, simply saying that 
the zone was not supposed to last forever misses the point of the question and does not tell 
the complete story. It does not tell the complete story because the end date was always 
flexible, up to those willing and able to fund such an initiative. As one respondent wrote, 
“Based on my understanding the Green Impact Zone was designed to last for 2 years to 
maximize the Federal Stimulus funding opportunities. Due to the amount of progress, it was 
funded beyond the original timeline” (RESPONDENT #7, 2016). Two years turned into five, 
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and there is no reason that extending that timeline further could not have happened. In fact, 
one respondent even provided a vision of the Green Impact Zone as a longer endeavor: 
I think the Zone would still be in operation today if it was designed as a 10-year 
initiative. This would have made provisions for plenty of time to determine a 
successful model and assist the neighborhoods and residents through a “maintenance 
phase” to sustain the programs that were birthed through the initiative. It also would 
have allowed for more time to identify long-term fundraising and partnerships. 
(RESPONDENT #4, 2016) 
 
The question, then, is why wasn’t the zone extended beyond its five-year existence, should it 
have been extended, and what could it have done differently? 
 Based on information gleaned from conversations with people close to the Green 
Impact Zone, the primary reason the zone no longer exists is that funding was discontinued. 
An important distinction needs to be made between the money that the Green Impact Zone 
was able to leverage on behalf of the neighborhoods and the money that went to paying the 
initiative’s operational costs (office space, staff salaries, and so forth). As discussed 
previously, the Green Impact Zone’s operational costs were paid directly by the city of 
Kansas City or by using funding available to its elected officials. From the zone’s inception, 
the strategy of Kansas City was to fund the Green Impact Zone’s staff in full to begin, but to 
gradually decrease the amount of funding it received from the city. According to someone 
close to the Green Impact Zone, 
The principal reason that funding did not continue to support the staff was because it 
came from the city. They could not sustain nor justify politically that level of funding 
to a single community. Although everyone agrees that decline that occurred over 
decades will take a long time to correct, they do not have the political will to sustain 
the investment for that period of time. (RESPONDENT #11, 2016) 
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That person went on to explain that the millions of dollars that the Green Impact Zone was 
awarded through grants could not be used to pay for expenses such as office space or staff 
salaries.  
Green Impact Zone Model: Legacy 
 The Green Impact Zone of Missouri may have been focused on a relatively small 
area, but it took on big challenges and had lofty aspirations. A project with a high-profile 
launch filled with confident rhetoric must either live up to the goals it publicly set for itself or 
risk being criticized for underachieving. Although the closing of the Green Impact Zone was 
met with mixed emotions from journalists, few comments appeared in these articles from the 
people who were involved in the day-to-day operations of the initiative. Neighborhood 
leaders, Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) staff, active residents, and Green Impact 
Zone staff were asked to answer the question, “What do you consider the legacy of the Green 
Impact Zone?” Their answers to this question provide the context for this section. 
 For some respondents, the Green Impact Zone model is a powerful way to help urban 
neighborhoods chip away at feelings of powerlessness and to reverse the effects of decades 
of disinvestment. Specifically, by using a holistic approach that targets a wide range of the 
effects of poverty and segregation, the Green Impact Zone model focuses on the “trajectory 
of change” for neighborhoods. Mapping a trajectory of change requires that community 
participation be regarded as the most important job of a place-based development 
organization and requires the organization to take a long-term approach to redevelopment 
and reorganizing a community. By simultaneously investing in the physical infrastructure of 
a place and the leadership and organizational capacity of the residents in that place, this 
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model creates momentum for growth and trains the people who will take up the challenge of 
continuing to build a thriving community. This is reflected in a statement from one 
respondent: 
The legacy of the Green Impact Zone is the comprehensive model with emphasis on 
the trajectory of change. The trajectory of change is what takes time to evolve 
because it deals with the intrinsic growth of residents involved. Emphasizing the role 
of empowering individuals to address their own issues along with the necessity of 
people with resources being educated about what it really takes to revitalize a 
community is critical. (RESPONDENT #4, 2016) 
 
The emphasis on increasing neighborhood capacity has also helped boost the 
effectiveness of the area’s neighborhood associations. Training and funding was given to 
these groups throughout the duration of the Green Impact Zone, which has allowed all of the 
organizations previously lacking non-profit status to receive it. This status, along with some 
new community spaces that were provided by funding leveraged by the Green Impact Zone, 
will give these associations the infrastructure needed to continue the work done by the Green 
Impact Zone. The Green Impact Zone worked with these groups all together from the earliest 
stages of the initiative. By bringing these neighborhood associations to the table together, the 
Green Impact Zone established a relationship among these groups that has endured even after 
the closing of the initiative. Many respondents praised the Green Impact Zone for fostering a 
strong connection between residents and neighborhood leaders:  
The Green Impact Zone made a mark in the neighborhood. It increased awareness 
among residents of the need for change and actually showed residents how to do 
things to bring about change. A great deal of emphasis was placed on capacity 
building and providing residents with the skills needed to bring about change. 
Overall, I believe that the community received great benefit from the Green Impact 
Zone. (RESPONDENT #9, 2016). 
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Another respondent wrote, “The zone left the community much better organized than it had 
found it” (RESPONDENT #11, 2016). 
  One defining feature of the Green Impact Zone was its paid staff. The number of 
Green Impact Zone staff members varied from four to six throughout the initiative’s lifetime 
and included a Director, Assistant Director, Administrative Office Coordinator, and other 
specialists. Part of the cost of operating the Green Impact Zone was also the staff’s 
relationship with MARC. Using MARC as the parent organization of the Green Impact Zone 
increased their operational capacity and allowed them to focus on neighborhood issues. One 
respondent praised the Green Impact Zone staff, writing, 
The Zone also demonstrated the need for a team of professional staff with a wide 
range of experiences to be employed in executing the revitalization. MARC employed 
high performing staff who could both plan and implement. The staff was able to 
relate to the residents as well as navigate conversations and partnerships with elected 
officials, corporations, and private enterprise representatives. This is a rare skill set, 
but MARC was able to attract staff that met the criteria. (RESPONDENT #4, 2016) 
 
This enthusiasm wasn’t shared by everyone, however: 
If we had the opportunity to start over, I think a longer-term effect and impact could 
have been achieved, if the money had flowed through the existing neighborhood 
organizations—those with the capacity to receive/administer/be accountable for the 
funding. Instead of forming a separate organization with relatively high paid staff, 
leasing expensive office space, purchasing furniture and equipment, and all of the 
other things that accompanied the Green Zone’s level of autonomy, the money could 
have been spent more efficiently and to greater long-term effect if it had flowed 
through the existing not-for-profit neighborhood organizations. Congressman Cleaver 
and/or the City could have been the overseer and provided assistance in making sure 
that the established organizations worked together to achieve desired results.  
 
In actuality, at the start, the established neighborhood organizations worked together 
with the assigned MARC staff person, Dean Katerndahl, [Government Innovations 
Forum Director], and held a number of meetings with residents to establish the 
framework for the Zone, set goals, and identify priorities—this was done over a 
number of months before the Green Zone staff was hired. These neighborhood 
organizations could have continued working together with Dean Katerndahl’s 
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assistance, to implement the plan and ensure continued resident involvement and the 
achievement of outcomes. The dollars would have gone much farther and the 
neighborhood organizations would have been able to apply for grant money to 
continue moving forward, increasing their capacity to perform more effectively—in 
retrospect, this should actually have been a requirement. I do not believe that the 
Green Zone was organized in a manner to apply for, receive, and administer grants—
all of this was done by MARC—thus, the way the Green Zone was set up from the 
start, actually led to its short-term existence. (RESPONDENT #9, 2016) 
 
 Differences of opinions about the value of the Green Impact Zone staff echo the 
disagreements from critics about the value of the Green Impact Zone as a whole. Evaluating 
the achievements of the Green Impact Zone, even now, must be a preliminary endeavor, and 
discussing the model and the process can and should continue. The opinions of those closest 
to the Green Impact Zone could potentially be biased, but their experience of going through 
the daily operations of the initiative gives them a unique and valuable perspective for anyone 
considering applying the Green Impact Zone model in another location. By the time the 
projects discussed herein are all completed and the effects of the Green Impact Zone are 
more fully quantifiable, the memories of those who helped create the Green Impact Zone 
may have faded.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 When the Green Impact Zone of Missouri was announced to significant fanfare, it 
was touted as a national model for neighborhood revitalization through place-based 
investment. It intended to tackle the diverse challenges facing five neighborhoods in central 
Kansas City, Missouri. During its five-year existence, the Green Impact Zone helped 
leverage major investments within its boundaries and succeeded in changing the narrative for 
many of the residents living in the five neighborhoods. 
 Among many Kansas Citians, however, the reputation of the Green Impact Zone 
remains in question. In conversation and online, many residents of Kansas City expressed 
regret that money was wasted on a project that they feel failed to fix anything. Articles 
written about the closing of the Green Impact Zone cast the initiative as a worthy, but 
dysfunctional attempt at lasting change. They pointed to missteps and failed promises, and 
asked their readers to consider how much things have really improved since the opening of 
the Green Impact Zone (von Drehle, 2014). 
 This thesis began as an attempt to document the history of the Green Impact Zone and 
to determine whether the Green Impact Zone model is one worth implementing around the 
nation. The thesis succeeded in collecting and documenting the history of the initiative and 
should be a comprehensive source for the Green Impact Zone’s accomplishments, 
shortcomings, and many first-hand experiences with the place-based experiment. The scope 
and timing of this thesis makes it impossible to clearly and definitively evaluate the strength 
of the Green Impact Zone model. Even now, more than seven years after the announcement 
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of the Green Impact Zone of Missouri, attempting to determine the ultimate value of the 
initiative would be premature. The nature of neighborhood change, especially sustainable, 
long-term neighborhood change, is gradual. Although many people understand that the Green 
Impact Zone neighborhoods declined over the course of decades, they oftentimes still lack 
the patience and political will to commit the time and energy it would take to reverse the 
effects of such disinvestment.  
This conflict between the ways that we view neighborhood decline and neighborhood 
revitalization differently is telling. Many may view the process (period of time, history) of 
neighborhood decline as a sort of “natural process,” that Kansas City as a whole has reached 
some sort of equilibrium by allowing some areas of the city to thrive while others decline. 
They would then view the Green Impact Zone, with all the attention and resources that were 
directed towards it, as a sort of government “intervention” against natural market forces. We 
cannot allow this way of viewing things to continue. The chapter on the history of Kansas 
City has shown that there is nothing “natural” or “inevitable” about urban processes that 
produce a city where such extreme racial and economic disparity can exist across the street 
from each other. Overt racism has played a role, as have subtler forces such as the 
racialization of neighborhoods, or real-estate professionals’ leveraging of racial stereotypes 
for financial gain. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Kansas City’s public school 
system, local real estate developers, and elected officials, among others, all contributed to 
exclusionary policies that allowed for institutionalized segregation. 
Geographers such as Soja and Harvey and the philosopher Lefebvre have taught that 
individual city functions such as markets for land, labor, and housing will tend to favor the 
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wealthy and powerful. Soja believed that the most direct path to a just city is through policies 
that allocate resources towards “positive (socially beneficial) spillover or multiplier effects 
from the locational or spatial pattern of public and private investments and where special 
attention is given to redress unusual environmental problems” (Soja, 2010, pp. 85-86). Soja 
explained, “this approach steers the search for justice toward access to the positive effects 
emanating from the urban economy, akin to the right to the city idea, and toward 
fundamental questions of environmental justice and social democracy” (Soja, 2010, pp. 85-
86). 
The Green Impact Zone fits the approach for urban justice that Soja encouraged. 
Place-based investment can be very successful when it creates a sort of “neighborhood 
momentum”; this is what Soja meant when he wrote about the “spillover and multiplier 
effects.” The dollars invested in a place-based program such as the Green Impact Zone can 
go further because they are invested in public goods (infrastructure that everyone has access 
to) and because they make it more likely that other public and private institutions will 
increase their investments in the community.  
What Soja or Harvey or Lefebvre do not mention, and what makes substantive 
neighborhood change difficult, is the long timeline that it requires. In one sense, this thesis 
(and the Green Impact Zone effort as a whole) is a recognition of how strongly the history of 
a place shapes that place’s present, and how much effort it takes to unleash its future from its 
past. The histories of Historic Manheim Park, 49-63/Troostwood, Ivanhoe, Blue Hills, and 
Town Fork Creek have not, however, blocked them from reaching what they are today: proud 
neighborhoods with strong leadership and lots of positive momentum. If the work that the 
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Green Impact Zone began—the work of bringing people together and giving them a reason to 
believe that change is possible—had ended with the termination of the Green Impact Zone, 
this momentum would have been lost. Instead, just the opposite has happened; since the 
closure of the Green Impact Zone, two new initiatives have picked up the torch.  
The Urban Neighborhood Initiative (UNI) and the Kansas City Catalytic Urban 
Redevelopment (KC-CUR) are both place-based, community-development initiatives whose 
geographic target areas at least partially overlap that of the Green Impact Zone. According to 
its website,  
The Urban Neighborhood Initiative—one of the Chamber's Big 5 ideas—is a 
nonprofit organization established to revitalize neighborhoods in a target area in 
Kansas City's urban core, focusing on health and safety, education and prosperity for 
generations to come. Formed as a partnership between the United Way of Greater 
Kansas City and the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, UNI works with 
[10 as of 2017] neighborhood organizations, residents and through collaborative 
relationships with business, industry, government and community organizations. Our 
initiative focus area is from 22nd Street to 52nd Street and from Troost to 71 
Highway, in Kansas City, Missouri. (Urban Neighborhood Initiative, 2016, para. 1) 
 
The other initiative, KC-CUR, is a combination of Greater Kansas City LISC (Local 
Initiative Support Corporation) in partnership with the city of Kansas City, Missouri, Urban 
Neighborhood Initiative, Mid-America Regional Council, and the Kansas City District 
Council of the Urban Land Institute. Its goal is “to galvanize civic and corporate interests 
around socio-economic redevelopment and community building in Kansas City’s urban core 
east of Troost Avenue” (LISC, 2016, para. 1).  
KC-CUR intends to implement transformative neighborhood revitalization within the 
UNI area, specifically near Prospect, Troost, Ivanhoe and Wendell Phillips neighborhoods 
(KC-CUR Report Release, 2016). Although the literature about these initiatives mentions the 
 119 
 
Green Impact Zone only in passing, the similarities of these programs to the Green Impact 
Zone, such as in their missions, models, and the areas they serve, are noticeable. The KC-
CUR homepage even states, “The Kansas City Catalytic Urban Redevelopment (KC-CUR) 
initiative is focused on an implementation strategy in the UNI footprint on Kansas City’s east 
side, building upon the momentum that is escalating east of Troost.” There is little doubt that 
the Green Impact Zone is a large part of that momentum that Kansas City’s east side is 
beginning to witness. I tried repeatedly to make contact with representatives of either of these 
organizations but was unable to do so. I hope that the work of comparing the Green Impact 
Zone to UNI and KC-CUR is picked up by someone else, either in the media or in academia. 
Going forward, it will be important to the story of the Green Impact Zone to understand how 
it is perceived by other place-based programs that follow it. 
There are many other major opportunities to continue the work that I began with this 
thesis, either by extending the timeline beyond when this thesis was written, by using any 
variety of more data-driven research methods to track the value of the Green Impact Zone, or 
by connecting the work that the Green Impact Zone did to other place-based urban initiatives 
around the country or even elsewhere in the world. Other than connecting the work by the 
Green Impact Zone and UCI or KC-CUR, some specific suggestions as to what work still 
needs to be done related to the topic of this thesis are: 
(1) Continue to watch how the Green Impact Zone neighborhoods change over time, 
both as a result of the Green Impact Zone programs and otherwise. There are many valuable 
ways of evaluating neighborhood change, but some that might be especially worthwhile for 
this area would be to look at changes in housing prices and rates of homeownership. Other 
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data that might be valuable to assess would be socioeconomic and demographic changes, 
especially in income levels, education, median age, or racial makeup. Also, it will be 
essential to evaluate if the investments in public infrastructure continue and if interest from 
private developers increases. At the time of writing, new market rate and subsidized housing 
continues to appear in the neighborhoods, and it will be important to see how much and how 
long this trend continues. 
(2) Compare the work done by the Green Impact Zone to other proven place-based 
groups around the country with a deep case study approach to multiple place-based 
initiatives. This comparison should focus on what all of these groups have had in common 
and how they have differed. Special consideration should be made to compare the historical 
and current geographies of these places, the strengths and weaknesses of a given model, as 
well as the greatest obstacles to progress, funding levels and sources, scales of operation, and 
timelines. 
(3) Continue to follow up with residents and track the usage patterns of the programs 
and facilities that the Green Impact Zone initiative made possible. The chapter in this thesis 
titled “The Green Impact Zone of Missouri” outlines the accomplishments of the Green 
Impact Zone, many of which are programs or facilities that remain in place even with the 
closing of the Green Impact Zone Initiative in 2014. It is important to understanding the 
ongoing legacy of the Green Impact Zone to see what type of effect these accomplishments 
have on the neighborhood as time goes on, and to see if those that take advantage of these 
programs or facilities know the role the Green Impact Zone played in making these 
opportunities possible.  
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(4) Barack Obama’s second presidential term (2013-2017) is over at the time of this 
writing, and with his departure from office, the level of federal support and investment for 
place-based programs and American urban programs in general may diminish. There is an 
opportunity to track how changes at the federal level affect how place-based programs 
provide resources to neighborhoods. 
 As I stated before, this thesis began as an attempt to document the history of the 
Green Impact Zone, but it means so much more to me than that. This is a chance to tell an 
important story about a moment in history when Kansas City, and the United States of 
America, had the will to not just talk about but creatively address the problems facing our 
inner cities. The characters in this story are the dedicated, sacrificing, and talented people 
who made the Green Impact Zone possible, and the loyal, resilient, and visionary residents of 
the Green Impact Zone who make their neighborhood a better place every day. I cannot 
affirm, definitively, whether the Green Impact Zone lived up to its expectations, or even its 
potential, and I cannot predict what the future looks like for the residents of Historic 
Manheim Park, 49-63/Troostwood, Ivanhoe, Blue Hills, and Town Fork Creek, and the rest 
of Kansas City’s core area, but I can state that after the time I’ve spent with the people who 
live, work, and play in these neighborhoods, I know they are in good hands. 
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APPENDIX 
 
  
Dear ____________, 
My name is Kevin Wickman, I am a Master’s Student in the University of Missouri – Kansas 
City’s Department of Geosciences, and am nearing completion of my master’s thesis titled 
The Green Impact Zone of Missouri: An Analysis of Place-Based Investment. My thesis will 
document the history and accomplishments of the Green Impact Zone, as well as be a 
reflection on the challenges of creating permanent change in historically underserved 
communities. Every attempt has been made throughout my thesis to be objective despite the 
fact that I am a past intern at the Green Impact Zone and a strong supporter of the Green 
Impact Zone initiative. 
I am asking you for a favor. On the next page of this document, you will find an eleven-
question survey; the questions range from the general, about grass-roots community 
development, to the specific about the Green Impact Zone of Missouri. If you would please 
answer these eleven questions as fully and as honestly as possible, I would be very, very 
grateful. You can write your answers to these questions directly in this document or in a 
separate document. I understand that finding the time to complete this request may be 
difficult, but without your answers to these questions I will not be able to move forward with 
my thesis. It is very important that all respondents complete and return this survey. 
All of your answers will be entirely anonymous: any comments used in my thesis will be 
unattributed, and I will destroy any record of your answers upon completion of my thesis. I 
hope that you will accept these assurances and will feel comfortable being honest and 
complete in your answers to these questions.  
If you have any apprehension about answering these questions, please let me know. If you 
would rather contact me by phone, my number is 630-430-9096. I would be happy to meet 
with you in person or work to accommodate you in any way. 
Thank you, 
 
Kevin Wickman 
M.S. in Environmental and Urban Geosciences Candidate 
University of Missouri Kansas City 
Department of Geosciences 
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The Green Impact Zone of Missouri operated in Kansas City, Missouri from 2009 until 2014 
as a national model for place-based investment. Missouri Congressman Emanuel Cleaver II 
is credited with pioneering the initiative, which was overseen for 5 years by Kansas City 
metropolitan-area regional planning organization the Mid-America Regional Council. 
During those 5 years, the Green Impact Zone directed about $166 million dollars into a 150-
square-block area from 39th Street to 51st Street and included Troost and Prospect avenues 
and as well Emanuel Cleaver II Boulevard. The money came largely from federal funding 
made available in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and 
went towards neighborhood infrastructure and investments in human capital, with an 
emphasis on environmental sustainability. The initiative ultimately shut down in 2014 due to 
a lack of funding. 
 
First, I would like to ask you a few general questions on community development and 
neighborhood revitalization: 
 
1. What is the difference between place-based and people-based initiatives? 
 
 
 
 
2. What role do residents play in re-developing their neighborhoods? 
 
 
 
 
3. What do you believe is more effective: channeling funding to official neighborhood 
organizations that represent communities in need or directly to individuals in need? 
Please explain your answer. 
 
 
 
 
4. What is the value of a predominantly minority neighborhood?  
 
 
Next, I want to ask some more specific questions about the Green Impact Zone of Missouri, a 
place-based initiative that was active in Kansas City’s urban core from 2009 to 2014:  
 
5. What do you think were the goals of the Green Impact Zone, and how well did the 
Green Impact Zone accomplish these goals?  
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6. In your opinion, how involved were the residents of the Green Impact Zone in the 
Green Impact Zone’s decision-making? How did this influence the value of the Green 
Impact Zone? 
 
 
 
 
7. How effective was the Green Impact Zone at leveraging public investment in the 
community to encourage long-term improvements in neighborhood quality-of-life 
characteristics such as housing, employment opportunity, or resident health? Please 
explain your answer. 
 
 
 
 
8. The Green Impact Zone initiative was awarded many millions of dollars and yet it 
shut down after about 5 years. Why do you think the Green Impact Zone was 
stopped/defunded, and what could it have done differently to still be in operation 
today? 
 
 
 
 
9. What do you consider the legacy of the Green Impact Zone? Please explain your 
comments. 
 
 
 
10. Are there any other comments you would like to add about your experience with the 
Green Impact Zone, during its operation or afterward? 
 
 
 
 
11. Can you recommend anyone else to which I should send this survey? If so, please 
provide contact information. 
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